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FREEDOM TO HACK 
Ido Kilovaty1 
Abstract 
The proliferation of Internet-connected smart devices (the “Internet of 
Things”) has become a major threat to privacy, user security, Internet 
security, and even national security. These threats are manifestations of 
externalities primarily resulting from a market failure in the Internet of 
Things industry, in which vendors do not have an incentive to implement 
reasonable security in the software embedded in devices they produce, 
thus creating cheap and unsecure devices. This Article argues that law 
and policy have a central role to play in making this digital ecosystem 
more secure – not only through direct regulation of this industry, but 
primarily through allowing individual security researchers to hack for 
security – or “ethical hacking.” At present, laws that prohibit hacking, 
such as the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act, are adopting a strict liability approach to hacking, which 
criminalizes almost any form of hacking, regardless of motivation or 
potential benefits. This Article rejects this outdated approach in the wake 
of ubiquitous cyber-attacks, imperfect software, and the emerging Internet 
of Things ecosystem. 
This Article argues that law and regulatory agencies should accommodate 
hacking for security purposes to allow security researchers to discover 
possible vulnerabilities while shielding them from copyright infringement 
or criminal liabilities. While security research into software and hardware 
is desirable, the law by and large restricts such research. This results in a 
reality of highly unsecure Internet-of-Things devices and could potentially 
lead to serious harms to security and privacy. Such a legal 
accommodation should be supported by other legal adaptations, mainly 
involving regulatory oversight and enforcement, consistent rules for 
                                                     
1 The author is a Cyber Fellow at the Center for Global Legal Challenges and a 
Resident Fellow at the Information Society Project, Yale Law School. I wish to 
thank The Center for Cyber Law & Policy at the University of Haifa for its 
generous support, which made this project possible. I would also like to thank 
Rosa Brooks, Oona Hathaway, Scott Shapiro, Robin West, Taisu Zhang, Molly 
Brady, Rebecca Crootof, Claudia Haupt, the ISP fellows’ workshop, Data & 
Society fellows, and the Georgetown Law fellows’ workshop. This article is 
forthcoming in the OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL in 2019. 
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vulnerability disclosure, and clear distinctions between ethical and 
malicious hackers.   
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Everyday devices and appliances are becoming more 
sophisticated, computerized, and software-backed. Cars, 
thermostats, door locks, smart watches, and even toasters are now 
powered by code and connected to the Internet, which offers a 
variety of online features that allow users to remotely monitor and 
control their devices. These objects are collectively referred to as the 
“Internet of Things” (IoT) to denote that Internet is no longer 
exclusively a platform for people to communicate with each other; 
it is now also a network for “things” to communicate amongst 
themselves and at times to collect and transmit user data to 
corporations and state authorities.2  
The proliferation of IoT devices in personal, business, and 
public environments is part of a technological shift from hardware 
to software.3 Physical objects are being supplemented, and even 
replaced, by software.4 By 2020, it is expected that IoT will reach as 
many as 20 billion connected devices, compared to 8 billion today,5 
with other estimates extending to as much as 50 billion devices.6 
The future worth of the IoT industry is also estimated in the 
hundreds of billions of dollars should its trajectory remain as 
projected.7 This shift is preceded by a phenomenon of embedding 
processors into everyday “things.” In the past, this would have been 
immensely expensive and inefficient, whereas today, 
microprocessors are widely available and affordable, and Internet 
                                                     
2 See Bruce Schneier, Security and the Internet of Things, SCHNEIER ON SECURITY 
(Feb. 1, 2017) 
https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2017/02/security_and_th.html (arguing 
that data collected about us and the things we do is available to both corporations 
and governments).  
3 Paul Ohm & Blake Reid, Regulating Software When Everything Has Software, 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1672, 1673 (2016). 
4 Id. 
5 See Gartner Says 8.4 Billion Connected "Things" Will Be in Use in 2017, Up 31 
Percent From 2016, GARTNER (Feb. 7, 2017) 
http://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/3598917. 
6 INTERNET OF THINGS – PRIVACY & SECURITY IN A CONNECTED WORLD, FTC 
STAFF REPORT i (Jan. 2015). 
7 Swaroop Poudel, Internet of Things: Underlying Technologies, Interoperability, 
and Threats to Privacy and Security, 31(2) BERK. TECH. L. J. 997, 1009 (2016). 
 





speeds are constantly increasing, meaning that it is easier to 
manufacture “smart” objects that operate smoothly.8 
Software, however, is not the only emerging technological 
feature in everyday objects. The uniqueness of IoT is its Internet 
connectivity, which makes it part of the global network grid, with 
all the pertaining conveniences and dangers.9 The IoT trend will 
most likely continue to grow and pose serious challenges in the 
future, both legally and technically. Some argue that the IoT 
development may signal “the end of ownership,”10 since copyright 
may stifle any modification to the software of these devices, but 
copyright law is also in a way a form of information censorship.11 
However, I argue that unless a broad freedom to hack these 
devices for security purposes is recognized, at least until regulatory 
agencies catch up, IoT technology could also be the end of security 
                                                     
8 See BROADBAND COMMISSION FOR DIGITAL DEVELOPMENT, BROADBAND 
DRIVES THE INTERNET OF THINGS, 
http://www.broadbandcommission.org/Documents/Media%20Corner%20Files%
20and%20pdfs/Broadband%20drives%20the%20Internet%20of%20Things.pdf 
(“Broadband represents the vital final piece of the puzzle. The need for always-
on bandwidth combined with potentially huge numbers of networked objects – 
some estimate many billion individually connected devices – imply an immense 
data throughput on networks”). See also LOPEZ RESEARCH, AN INTRODUCTION TO 
THE INTERNET OF THINGS (IOT) 2 (Nov. 2013), available at 
http://www.cisco.com/c/dam/en_us/solutions/trends/iot/introduction_to_IoT_no
vember.pdf (identifying the many features of today’s tech world allowing the 
proliferation of IoT: IPv6, battery life, decreased cost of wireless networks, and 
broadband speeds).  
9 See Maria Farrell, The Internet of Things – Who Wins, Who Loses? GUARDIAN 
(Aug. 14, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/aug/14/internet-
of-things-winners-and-losers-privacy-autonomy-capitalism [“With its insecure 
devices with multiple points of data access, user applications that routinely 
exfiltrate our sensor data, activity logs and personal contacts, and a Sisyphean 
uphill struggle required to exert any control over who knows what about us, the 
Internet of things does more than create whole new cyber-security attack surfaces. 
It is so riddled with metastasising points of vulnerability that you begin to sense 
that these are not bugs, but features.”] 
10 See Pamela Samuelson, Freedom to Tinker, 17 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 563, 589 
(2016) (quoting AARON PERZANOWSKI & JASON SCHULTZ, THE END OF 
OWNERSHIP (2016)). 
11 See Susan Brenner, Complicit Publication: When Should the Dissemination of 
Ideas and Data be Criminalized? 13 ALB. L. J. SCI. & TECH. 101, 348–56 (2003). 
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and privacy, broadly speaking.12 This is particularly true considering 
that the complexities of IoT software will necessarily mean tradeoffs 
in terms of security, and vendors creating complex IoT software will 
have to test it for every possible attack or compromise, which is 
essentially impossible.13 Even if it were possible, experts argue that 
software engineers cannot predict future methods of attack,14 and 
software testing would also not solve the social engineering threat 
that targets the unwitting cooperation of users,15 which involves 
“opening an infected file, clicking on a malicious hyperlink, sending 
personal information to a phishing Web site, or manually adjusting 
security settings.”16 However, it is still believed that the vast 
majority of security breaches are caused by flaws in software.17 
While embedding access to the global network within ordinary 
objects offers many advantages – it makes devices more dynamic, 
customizable, user-friendly (to an extent), and, generally, smarter – 
it also poses a series of security challenges that, if they remain 
unaddressed, may represent actual threats to the “digital order” in 
the form of rampant security breaches and privacy violations.  
The major problem with today’s unsecure IoT environment is 
that it is largely a result of a market failure. The market failure 
manifests itself in multiple ways. First, the industry is not legally 
bound by any particular guidelines on security and privacy; a sizable 
number of devices are therefore unsecure, offering an opportunity 
for criminals and other exploiters to commit malicious cyber-attacks 
against innocent users. This could even go further; IoT can also be 
used as a proxy for larger attacks against critical infrastructure, 
                                                     
12 See Samuelson, supra note 10, at 589.  
13 Trevor A. Thompson, Terrorizing the Technological Neighborhood Watch: The 
Alienation and Deterrence of the “White Hats” Under the CFAA, 36 FLA. ST. U. 
L. REV. 537, 543 (2009). 
14 Capers Jones, Software Defect-Removal Efficiency, 29 COMPUTER 94, 94–95 
(1996).  
15 See Thompson, supra note 13, at 545 (“Even when software performs as 
intended, software cannot fully protect users from themselves.”) See also 
Immunizing the Internet, Or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the 
Worm, 119(8) HARV. L. REV. 2442, 2449 (2006) (“[I]t is much harder to ‘patch’ 
a person than a computer.”).  
16 See Thompson, supra note 13, at 547. 
17 See Derek Bambauer & Oliver Day, The Hacker’s Aegis, 60 EM. L. REV. 1051, 
1060 (“Gartner calculates that 75% of security breaches result from software 
flaws.”). 
 





including the very backbone of the Internet – an externality that 
neither vendors or IoT users necessarily care about, because they do 
not directly experience the adverse effects of those externalities.18 
Second, IoT vendors have no economic incentive to offer security 
as a feature in their products, primarily because consumers are not 
showing strong preferences toward security and privacy as higher 
priorities than lower prices. At the very least, informational gaps 
between vendors and consumers lead to an uninformed and 
inefficient choice by consumers.19 The Senate has recently 
recognized this particular market failure and has proposed IoT 
industry-focused legislation.20 
Ransomware attacks21 are only one example of malicious 
activity that criminals or nation-states may use against unsecure IoT 
devices, and reports indicate that ransomware against IoT is already 
taking place at present.22 Distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) 
                                                     
18 See Dyn Statement on 10/21/2016 DDoS Attack, https://dyn.com/blog/dyn-
statement-on-10212016-ddos-attack/ (explaining how an IoT-enabled denial-of-
service attack against DNS provider Dyn made it impossible for Internet users on 
the East Coast to reach various websites). See also Bruce Schneier, Your WiFi-
connected Thermostat Can Take Down the Whole Internet. We Need New 
Regulations, WASHINGTON POST (Nov. 3, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2016/11/03/your-wifi-
connected-thermostat-can-take-down-the-whole-internet-we-need-new-
regulations/ (“An additional market failure illustrated by the Dyn attack is that 
neither the seller nor the buyer of those devices cares about fixing the 
vulnerability. The owners of those devices don’t care. They wanted a webcam—
or thermostat, or refrigerator—with nice features at a good price. Even after they 
were recruited into this botnet, they still work fine—you can’t even tell they were 
used in the attack.”). 
19 See RICHARD SPINELLO, CYBERETHICS: MORALITY AND LAW IN CYBERSPACE 
152 (2006) (explaining that the loss of privacy is a market failure). 
20 See Senators Mark Warner, Cory Gardner, Ron Wyden, and Steve Daines, 




21 See Kim Zetter, What Is Ransomware? A Guide to the Global Cyberattack’s 
Scary Method, WIRED (Apr. 5, 2017), https://www.wired.com/2017/05/hacker-
lexicon-guide-ransomware-scary-hack-thats-rise (explaining that ransomware is 
malware that prevents access to data resident on a target computer by encrypting 
data files, without the user being able to access them until he or she pays the 
ransom). 
22 See Dan Bilefsky, Hackers Use New Tactic at Austrian Hotel: Locking the 
Doors, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2017) (explaining that computer systems responsible 
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attacks,23 data breaches, and surveillance24 are all possible threats to 
IoT users if its security problem remains unaddressed.25  
Recently, Bruce Schneier, leading cybersecurity and 
cryptography expert, referred to the increasing prevalence of IoT 
devices as a “World-sized Web,”26 denoting that this ubiquitous 
network of devices will benefit corporations seeking to maximize 
profits, open new vulnerabilities27 for criminals to exploit, and aid 
totalitarian regimes throughout the world. It is almost a cliché in the 
information security community that IoT devices are very often 
unsecure and relatively easy to hack28 due to an abundancy of 
software flaws, unpatched vulnerabilities, and even an inability to 
“patch” these devices’ flaws once they are discovered.29 This is 
                                                     
for the electronic key system was hit with ransomware). See also Nathaniel Mott, 
Ransomware Didn’t Lock People in Their Hotel Rooms, TOM’S HARDWARE (Jan. 
30, 2017), http://www.tomshardware.com/news/ransomware-didnt-lock-hotel-
rooms,33528.html (claiming that the Austrian hotel ransomware was not quite as 
reported, but a regular ransomware affecting generation of new keys).  
23 See Anonymous, Immunizing the Internet, Or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying 
and Love the Worm, 119(8) HARV. L. REV. 2442, 2444 (2006) (DDoS attacks are 
“self-propagating worms [who] take control of vulnerable computers . . . the 
attackers then command the computer to flood the targeted systems with requests 
for information, preventing legitimate traffic from getting through.”). 
24 See generally Andrew Ferguson, The Internet of Things and the Fourth 
Amendment of Effects, 104 CAL. L. REV. 805 (2016).  
25 See generally Michael Covington & Rush Carskadden, Threat Implications of 
the Internet of Things, 5th INT’L CONF. CY. CONFLICT (2013). 
26 See Bruce Schneier, The Internet of Things Will be the World’s Biggest Robot, 
SCHNEIER ON SECURITY (Feb. 4, 2016), 
https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2016/02/the_internet_of_1.html.  
27 For the purposes of this Article, “vulnerability” is broadly defined as “a set of 
conditions that may compromise the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of 
an information system. It is often a simple oversight or weakness in a computer’s 
software that lets the hacker manipulate computer data.” Edward Freeman, 
Vulnerability Disclosure: The Strange Case of Bret McDanel, 16 INFORMATION 
SYSTEMS SECURITY 127, 127 (2007).  
28 See Bruce Schneier, IoT Teddy Bear Leaked Personal Audio Recordings, 
SCHNEIER ON SECURITY (Mar. 15, 2017), 
https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2017/03/iot_teddy_bear_.html.  
29 Patchability – the ability to release security updates to fix vulnerabilities, is still 
unavailable in many IoT devices, see Bruce Schneier, The Internet of Things is 
Wildly Insecure – And Often Unpatchable, WIRED (Jan. 6, 2014), 
https://www.wired.com/2014/01/theres-no-good-way-to-patch-the-internet-of-
 





largely enabled by market forces, which pressure vendors to create 
cheaper devices at the cost of disregarding security and privacy.30 In 
other words, this reality is enabled by the tech industry’s drive to 
innovate at an accelerated pace,31 while working under the 
assumption that embedding cybersecurity could stifle this rapid 
innovation rate.32 
To address the abovementioned market failure, this Article 
argues that outsourcing some of the vulnerability discovery to third-
party actors – security researchers – would bolster IoT security. 
These researchers essentially employ hacking techniques for the 
purpose of enhancing security – in other words, they think and act 
like a hacker for the company in order to ward off future criminal 
hacking. 
Currently, federal law imposes significant limitations on 
unsolicited hacking for security research through both civil penalties 
and criminalization of certain hacking activities, leading to fears of 
legal jeopardy among members of the cybersecurity community.33 
                                                     
things-and-thats-a-huge-problem/ (“[I]t’s often impossible to patch the software 
or upgrade the components to the latest version.”). 
30 See CONNECTED WORLD: EXAMINING THE INTERNET OF THINGS: HEARING 
BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, 
UNITED STATES SENATE, ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS, FIRST 
SESSION, S. Hrg. 114–237, 119 (“The computer chips that power these systems 
are often cheaply produced, rarely updated or patched, and highly susceptible to 
hacks . . . . These devices will be cheap, even disposable, and the incentives for 
the manufacturer to provide regular security updates will be minimal.”). 
31 See Schneier (The Internet of Things Is Wildly Insecure – And Often 
Unpatchable) supra note 29 (giving an example of how some of the tech industry 
operates – “The chip manufacturer is busy shipping the next version of the chip, 
and the ODM is busy upgrading its product to work with this next chip. 
Maintaining the older chips and products just isn’t a priority. And the software is 
old, even when the device is new. For example, one survey of common home 
routers found that the software components were four to five years older than the 
device”). 
32 See Adam Thierer, Andrea O’Suillivan, Leave the Internet of Things Alone, 
U.S. NEWS (Jun. 12, 2017), https://www.usnews.com/opinion/economic-
intelligence/articles/2017-06-12/dont-stifle-the-internet-of-things-with-
regulation (arguing that heavy security regulation on IoT will place an undue 
burden on the IoT industry).  
33 UC Berkeley School of Information, Cybersecurity Research: Addressing the 
Legal Barriers and Disincentives, at 1 (Sept. 28, 2015), available at 
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Exceptions to these legal sanctions, if they exist, are typically very 
narrow and would still put benign actors under the threat of legal 
consequences from vendors, thus limiting the amount of overall 
security research as well as the ability to present such research in an 
academic setting for further study and development.34  
In order to enhance IoT security, the law, as well as the 
institutions creating, interpreting, and applying the law, should 
allow hacking for the purpose of security research. Such “benign” 
hacking would reveal flaws and weaknesses in software that, if 
exploited by malicious actors, could affect not only individuals’ 
personal security and privacy but even US national security.35 This 
approach will increase the efficiency of vulnerability disclosure and 
patching because there will be no chilling effect on the activity of 
revealing software vulnerabilities.36 To be clear, security research is 
only one part of the overall cybersecurity concoction, which should 
include, in Lawrence Lessig’s words, an optimal balance between 
“public law and private fences.”37 There is a race between 
benevolent and malicious actors in cyberspace, and the argument 
advanced by this paper seeks to empower actors who wish to 
improve the overall security and privacy of IoT. 
                                                     
https://www.ischool.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/cybersec-research-nsf-
workshop.pdf.  
34 See Derek Bambauer, Oliver Day, The Hacker’s Aegis, 60 EM. L. REV. 1051, 
1054 (2011) (arguing that IP laws stifle critical security research and blocks or 
limits the ability to share information relating to security flaws) (citing Jonathan 
L. Zittrain, The Generative Internet, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1974 (2006)).  
35 See Melissa Hathaway, Cyber Security: An Economic and National Security 
Crisis, 16 INTELLIGENCER 31 (2008). Also, see U.S. Department of Defense, DOD 
Announces Digital Vulnerability Disclosure Policy and “Hack the Army” Kick-
off (Nov. 21, 2016), https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Releases/News-
Release-View/Article/1009956/dod-announces-digital-vulnerability-disclosure-
policy-and-hack-the-army-kick-off (where then-Secretary of Defense, Ash 
Carter, underscores that “We want to encourage computer security researchers to 
help us improve our defenses. This policy gives them a legal pathway to bolster 
the department’s cybersecurity and ultimately the nation’s security.”). 
36 See Malena Carollo, Influencers: Lawsuits to Prevent Reporting Vulnerabilities 
Will Chill Research, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (Sep. 29, 2015) (providing 
data that 75% of leading experts (referred to as “the Influencers”) believe that 
lawsuits against vulnerability disclosure in public will have chilling effects on 
security research).  
37 See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE 2.0 170 (2006).  
 





The underlying hypothesis of this paper is that advancing IoT 
technologies will transform our lives entirely by becoming a 
substantial part of our society. The ubiquity of sensors, the 
physicality of most IoT devices, and the absence of reasonable 
default security standards could lead to major threats to individual 
and collective security and privacy. The rapid development of this 
field has already led to regulatory inefficiency and a serious market 
failure, enabling vendors to manufacture and sell unsecure IoT 
devices globally. Providing an incentive for the broader security 
community to become involved in fixing this ecosystem without 
fear of legal jeopardy will make individual users safer while also 
protecting critical infrastructure, such as hospitals, power plants, 
and the Internet backbone, from IoT externalities.38  
 This paper will proceed in four parts. In Part I, I will discuss the 
phenomenon of IoT – “the world of hackable things” – and provide 
an overview of the market failures at play. These market failures are 
at the crux of this Article’s argument because they allow threats to 
individual users and third-parties to flourish as a result of unsecure 
IoT devices. Part II will be dedicated to introducing the security 
research environment, in which different types of hackers and 
motivations are shaping reality. In Part III, I will focus on the legal 
hurdles impeding “the freedom to hack” – mainly the federal 
prohibition of circumvention of technological protection measures 
(TPMs) and criminal liability for unauthorized access to protected 
computers. Finally, Part IV will propose a concrete framework for 
creating a normative, technical, and institutional environment in 
which security researchers can achieve their goal of making 
software more secure by distinguishing benevolent from malicious 
actors, strengthening regulatory oversight and enforcement, 
clarifying statutory boundaries, regulating patchability, creating a 
consistent procedure for disclosure of vulnerabilities, and tackling 
security by obscurity. 
I. Internet of Hackable Things 
                                                     
38 See Anonymous, Immunizing the Internet, Or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying 
and Love the Worm, 119(8) HARV. L. REV. 2442, 2443 (2006) (“Not only does 
current policy create the wrong incentives regarding cybercrime, it does too little 
to encourage computer hackers and computer users to contribute actively to 
Intern.”). 
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It was probably unimaginable at the conception of the Internet 
that one day it would be used to connect everyday “things” to it. The 
development of this phenomenon allowed for machine-to-machine 
communication, the “communication between . . . entities that do 
not necessarily need any direct human intervention.”39 Whether 
through a smart thermostat that learns a user’s temperature-setting 
patterns,40 a bracelet that tells a user how well she exercises and 
sleeps,41 a webcam that can wirelessly transmit photos and videos,42 
a smart toaster offering the perfect toast,43 or a car that has the ability 
to connect to the Internet and offer navigation services, self-
diagnosis tools, and remote control through widely used 
smartphones,44 such machine-to-machine networks abound.  
There is a growing understanding that “things with computers 
embedded in them” are becoming “computers with things attached 
to them.”45 This means that a whole set of legal issues traditionally 
pertaining to computers are transposed into the area of ordinary 
daily objects, but those ordinary daily objects now have a few extra 
features that make questions of legality tremendously challenging. 
For example, previously, if a toaster malfunctioned, it would have 
been mainly a consumer protection problem, whereas today, it might 
as well be a telecommunications problem, involving a whole set of 
                                                     
39 Roberto Minerva, Abyi Biru & Domenico Rotondi, Towards a Definition of the 
Internet of Things (IoT), IEEE INTERNET INITIATIVE, 12 (May 27, 2015), 
http://iot.ieee.org/images/files/pdf/IEEE_IoT_Towards_Definition_Internet_of_
Things _Revision1_27MAY15.pdf  
40 Nest, Meet the Thermostat, https://nest.com/thermostat/meet-nest-thermostat.  
41 See Andrew Meola, Wearable Technology and IoT Wearable Devices, 
BUSINESS INSIDER (Dec. 19, 2016), http://www.businessinsider.com/wearable-
technology-iot-devices-2016-8.  
42 See Haley Edwards, How Web Cams Helped Bring Down the Internet, Briefly, 
TIME (Oct. 25, 2016), http://time.com/4542600/internet-outage-web-cams-
hackers.  
43 Joel Hruska, The Internet of Things Has Officially Peak Stupid, Courtesy of 
This Smart Toaster, EXTREME TECH (Jan. 5, 2017), 
https://www.extremetech.com/electronics/242169-internet-things-officially-hit-
peak-stupid-courtesy-smart-toaster-griffin-technology.  
44 See Thilo Koslowski, Forget the Internet of Things: Here Comes the ‘Internet 
of Cars’, WIRED (Jan. 4, 2013), https://www.wired.com/2013/01/forget-the-
internet-of-things-here-comes-the-internet-of-cars.  
45 See Bruce Schneier, Security and the Internet of Things, SCHNEIER ON 
SECURITY (Feb. 1, 2017), 
https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2017/02/security_and_th.html. 
 





challenges pertaining to privacy and security and, in more extreme 
circumstances, national security.46 
While the general phenomenon of IoT is somewhat intuitive in 
today’s hyperconnected world, there is no official or widely adopted 
definition of the technology. One definition is “the ability of 
everyday objects to connect to the Internet and to send and receive 
data,”47 a feature that was previously nonexistent in everyday 
“things.” Another definition provides that IoT is “a network of 
items—each embedded with sensors—which are connected to the 
Internet”48; another similar definition characterizes IoT as a “system 
where the Internet is connected to the physical world via ubiquitous 
sensors.”49 While Internet connectivity is itself quite intuitive, often 
missing in defining IoT is an emphasis on the sensors, actuators, and 
CPUs, or cloud computers,50 that often comprise the IoT ecosystem. 
Unlike personal computers (desktop, laptops, smartphones, and 
the like), IoT devices often lack a user interface, or at least one that 
allows control over security and privacy features.51 IoT should also 
be contrasted from popular operating systems, which are supported 
by large tech companies who constantly offer updates to the 
software. This largely means that the degree of user control over the 
configuration of a device is significantly limited and is usually 
                                                     
46 See Mike Orcutt, Security Experts Warn Congress That Internet of Things 
Could Kill People, M.I.T. TECH. REV. (Dec. 5, 2016), 
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/603015/security-experts-warn-congress-
that-the-internet-of-things-could-kill-people.  
47 INTERNET OF THINGS – PRIVACY & SECURITY IN A CONNECTED WORLD, FTC 
STAFF REPORT i (Jan. 2015).  
48 See Kathy Pretz, Smart Sensors, THE INSTITUTE OF ELECTRICAL AND 
ELECTRONIC ENGINEERS (Mar. 14, 2014), http://theinstitute.ieee.org/technology-
topics/internet-of-things/smarter-sensors.  
49 Roberto Minerva, Abyi Biru, and Domenico Rotondi, Towards a Definition of 
the Internet of Things (IoT), IEEE INTERNET INITIATIVE, 10 (May 27, 2015), 
http://iot.ieee.org/images/files/pdf/IEEE_IoT_Towards_Definition_Internet_of_
Things _Revision1_27MAY15.pdf. 
50 The fact that many IoT devices are supported by cloud computing creates and 
additional risk to privacy, since data stored on the cloud could potentially become 
the target of a data breach against the cloud itself. See Bambauer, supra note 34, 
at 1059 (providing an example of cloud weakness that led to a security breach 
against Twitter).  
51 FTC IOT REPORT, supra note 6, at v.  
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controlled by the vendor, if at all. It is expected that the vendor will 
provide reasonable security already built into the device – “security 
by design” – but unfortunately, the current state of affairs in IoT has 
proven otherwise.52  
Understanding the physicality of IoT is crucial if we are to create 
solutions to the wide range of resulting legal challenges. IoT 
insecurity is not merely a theoretical threat – it is an actual danger 
to our very homes. Typically, an IoT device is comprised of three 
components – a sensor, a CPU (or cloud computer), and an 
actuator.53 While a sensor collects data about its users and 
environment,54 the CPU (or “the cloud”) processes that data and 
potentially commands the actuator to take appropriate actions. 
These two components are essential for controlling the actuator, 
which is an “output device[] that implement[s] decisions.”55 For 
example, a sensor could be a thermostat used to monitor the 
temperature, with a connected CPU tasked with determining 
whether the air conditioner should be turned on or off, which would 
be accomplished through the actuator, the actual object that this 
whole system was built to control. In a way, sensors are the “eyes 
and ears” of the Internet, and the actuators are “hands and feet.” The 
CPUs, in this analogy, would be the brain, since they process data 
and react to it according to certain predetermined software-based 
rules.56  
Since a typical user has little to no control over the security 
features (and many other features) of their specific device, 
enhancing the security of the device will necessarily require the user 
to tinker with the software, which could violate the anti-
circumvention rules of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
                                                     
52 See Symantec, An Internet of Things Reference Architecture (2016) (“Most IoT 
devices are “closed.” Customers can’t add security software after devices ship 
from the factory. Often, such tampering voids the warranty. For such reasons, 
security has to be built into IoT devices so that they are “secure by design.” In 
other words, for IoT, security must evolve from security just “bolted onto” 
existing systems such as servers and personal computer (PC) laptops and 
desktops. Security must evolve to security that is “built in” to the system before 
the system leaves the factory.”). 
53 See Schneier, supra note 2. 
54 Id. 
55 See Poudel, supra note 7, at 1003. 
56 See Schneier, supra note 2. 
 





(DMCA), unless the user is explicitly exempt from legal liability.57 
In addition, security researchers who might want to probe specific 
IoT devices for vulnerabilities might encounter threats of criminal 
liability and prosecution if the manner in which they access these 
devices is unauthorized – which includes virtually any form of 
hacking.58 
Therefore, users often have to rely on vendors’ practices of 
vulnerability patching and security by design, which do not always 
exist in a market of accelerated innovation and competition, 
particularly in cheaper devices.59 In many instances, a vendor’s 
decision whether to provide vulnerability patches is a question of 
risk assessment and market forces – and market forces, particularly 
in the tech industry, do not always work in favor of consumers (if 
we assume that privacy and security are in the interest of 
consumers).60 This is perhaps more alarming considering that the 
                                                     
57 See Aaron Alva, DMCA Security Research Exemption For Consumer Devices, 
Tech@FTC (Federal Trade Commission), https://www.ftc.gov/news-
events/blogs/techftc/2016/10/dmca-security-research-exemption-consumer-
devices. 
58 See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2). See also Erin Fleury, Is It Illegal to Test Websites 
For Security Flaws? Heartbleed & The CFAA, MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. F. (Dec. 
30, 2014), http://editions.lib.umn.edu/mjlst/is-it-illegal-to-test-websites-for-
security-flaws-heartbleed-the-cfaa (arguing that the discovery of the OpenSSL 
Heartbleed security flaw, which allowed intercepting encrypted information, 
caused systems “to send back far more than what is intended. Of course, the 
CFAA is meant to target people who use exploits such as this to gain unauthorized 
access to computer systems, so it would seem that using Heartbleed is clearly 
within the scope and purpose of the CFAA. The real problem arises, however, for 
people interested in independently (i.e. without authorization) testing a system to 
determine if it is still susceptible to Heartbleed or other vulnerabilities”). 
59 See Rapid7’s Comment to NTIA’s call for public comments on “The Benefits, 
Challenges, and Potential Roles for the Government in Fostering the 
Advancement of the Internet of Things”, available at 
https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/rapid7_comments_to_ntia_iot_r
fc_-_jun_2_2016.pdf (“Since IoT devices are highly diversified and include very 
inexpensive items manufactured by companies with limited security experience, 
the result can be a considerably more exploitable environment than the status 
quo.”). 
60 See Keynote Remarks of FTC Commissioner Terrell McSweeny, “Consumer 
Protection in the Age of Connected Everything” 3 (New York Law School, Feb. 
3, 2017) available at 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1070193/mcswe
eny_nyls_iot_sympoisum.pdf (“Consumer concern is heightened by business 
practices that often leave them in the lurch: IoT products may not have patch 
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cost of security breaches to users in aggregate is significantly higher 
than the cost to vendors, which could explain the gap in expectations 
between vendors and users.61 In other words, “systems are 
particularly prone to failure[] when the person guarding them is not 
the person who suffers when they fail.”62 
a. The Economics of IoT  
Many assume that the market will eventually solve the security 
and privacy problems of the IoT ecosystem. But this may not be 
accurate given that these problems are themselves a result of a 
market failure. The unlikelihood of a market solution is particularly 
stark when examined in terms of the costs associated with cyber-
attacks on IoT, which are often experienced by third parties and are 
therefore considered externalities.63 Because such externalities 
involve a wide variety of sectors and actors, with varying degrees of 
costs and benefits, the prospect of an efficient transaction is 
unlikely.  
When it comes to externalities in software, it is often believed 
that software vulnerabilities are “inevitable externalities” because 
flawless software64 does not yet exist. This is further exacerbated by 
the pressure on vendors by competition to release software to the 
market as fast as they can.65 While this trend is generally true, it is 
                                                     
support or the same life expectancy as other connected products, and these 
limitations are not always communicated clearly to consumers… Consumers are 
repeatedly saying that data security is a top barrier to purchasing connected 
devices.”). 
61 See Bambauer, supra note 34, at 1059 (“[U]sers face greater harm than vendors 
do, especially overall. While precise figures are difficult to ascertain, reliable 
estimates of the worldwide economic damage caused by digital attacks in 2003 
range from $12.5 billion for worms and viruses, and $226 billion for all attacks, 
to $157–$192 billion on Windows PCs alone in 2004. Losses to vendors from 
security breaches, such as from increased support costs, reputational harm, and 
declines in share price, are also uncertain, but likely considerably smaller. 
Vendors, therefore, have less incentive to fix bugs than is socially optimal.”) 
62 Anderson & Moore, The Economics of Information Security, 314 SCIENCE 610, 
610 (2006).  
63 See Schneier, supra note 2. 
64 See JOHN VIEGA, THE MYTHS OF SECURITY 142–44 (Mike Loukides ed., 2009). 
See also Jay Pil Choi et al., Network Security: Vulnerabilities and Disclosure 
Policy, 58 J. INDUS. ECON. 868, 869 (2010).  
65 See Micah Schwalb, Exploit Derivatives & National Security, 9 YALE J. L. & 
TECH. 162, 168–69 (2007). 
 





still possible to make software better through constant fixing of 
vulnerabilities, therefore reaching a socially optimal level of 
security.  
Furthermore, companies who decide to enter the IoT market do 
not always have the experience needed to implement security 
features in their devices.66 There is a sizable degree of opportunism 
when it comes to new players in the IoT industry, making unsecure 
IoT devices pervasive.  
In addition, IoT devices are largely inexpensive and disposable, 
which precludes most costly security features.67 The literature 
identifies additional reasons for ubiquitous unsecure IoT devices – 
lack of experience in data security among vendors, absence of 
processing power in most IoT devices for “robust security measures 
such as encryption,” and unforeseen threats,68 given that the 
attackers are humans who constantly adapt and change their 
methods.69 The recurring theme is the inability of vendors to fully 
solve the potential security flaws in IoT devices on their own.  
At the same time, the users themselves are often unaware of the 
risks; IoT architecture is often driven by vendors attempting to 
reduce costs, and the individual consumer is typically interested in 
a product’s features, rather than its security settings.70 Whereas 
computers have been hackable since their conception, the IoT 
ecosystem increases the stakes to a far greater state of urgency. This 
is largely enabled by the physicality of IoT, which can cause serious 
physical harms, and the ubiquitous sensors, which pose a privacy 
concern to users.71 This notion is further supported by the 
                                                     
66 FTC IOT REPORT, supra note 6, at 13. 
67 FTC IOT REPORT, supra note 6, at 13. 
68 See Poudel, supra note 7, at 1015 (citing Scott Peppet, Regulating the Internet 
of Things: First Steps Towards Managing Discrimination, Privacy, Security & 
Consent, 93 TEX. L. REV. 85, 135–36 (2014)).  
69 NIELS FERGUSON & BRUCE SCHNEIER, PRACTICAL CRYPTOGRAPHY 5, 11–12 
(2003). 
70 See FTC IOT REPORT, supra note 6, at i–ii.  
71 See Schneier, supra note 2 (“All computers are hackable. This has as much to 
do with the computer market as it does with the technologies. We prefer our 
software full of features and inexpensive, at the expense of security and reliability. 
That your computer can affect the security of Twitter is a market failure. The 
industry is filled with market failures that, until now, have been largely ignorable. 
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unwillingness of certain tech companies to patch their software if it 
does not yield an effective cost-benefit analysis.72 Furthermore, 
while security and privacy are certainly important to consumers, it 
is unclear whether consumers will agree to pay more for a product 
that is more secure, even if current vendor–user informational gaps 
are decreased.73 This suggests that even if informing users of the 
risks is unlikely to solve the problem of unsecure IoT. 
The classic solution to externalities resulting from market 
failures is government intervention in the form of legislation and 
regulation.74 This Article takes another approach – legislation and 
regulation of the IoT industry are certainly required, but they could 
be far more efficient in conjunction with the lifting of burdens 
constraining security researchers. In other words, the market failure 
described in this subchapter can be mitigated by security researchers 
improving software quality through ethical hacking.  
b. The Technology of IoT 
IoT offers a convenience not previously available in offline 
objects. First, the user has some remote control over certain features 
of the device, often from a smartphone or personal computer. She 
has the ability to customize and monitor the functionality of her 
appliances, though this is often limited through the user interface 
provided by the vendor.75 Second, IoT technology equips vendors 
                                                     
As computers continue to permeate our homes, cars, businesses, these market 
failures will no longer be tolerable. Our only solution will be regulation, and that 
regulation will be foisted on us by a government desperate to "do something" in 
the face of disaster.”). 
72 See Andrew Aurenheimer, Forget Disclosure – Hackers Should Keep Security 
Holes to Themselves, WIRED (Nov. 29, 2012), 
https://www.wired.com/2012/11/hacking-choice-and-disclosure (“[T]he vendor 
may decide not to release a patch because a cost/benefit analysis conducted by an 
in-house MBA determines that it’s cheaper to simply do . . . nothing.”). 
73 See Jay Kesan & Carol Hayes, Bugs in the Market: Creating A Legitimate, 
Transparent, and Vendor-Focused Market for Software Vulnerabilities, 58 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 753, 781–82 (2016). 
74 See Eli Dourado & Jerry Brito, Is There a Market Failure in Cybersecurity?, 
106 MERCATUS ON POLICY (2012), p. 2. 
75 See Nick Feamster, Who Will Secure the Internet of Things? FREEDOM TO 
TINKER (Jan. 19, 2016), available at https://freedom-to-
tinker.com/2016/01/19/who-will-secure-the-internet-of-things (“Manufacturers 
of consumer products have little interest in releasing software patches and may 
 





with the ability to optimize and improve their products through 
processing user data generated by the devices. However, this comes 
at a cost, since consumer data may also be used in negative ways, 
such as aggressive advertising, sale to third parties, or enhancement 
of surveillance capabilities.76 Third, IoT technology offers 
interoperability between devices, which, though it is yet to be fully 
developed, allows devices to communicate with each other.77 These 
benefits may sometimes even relate to the health, quality of life, and 
wellbeing of the user. Insulin pumps and pacemakers are examples 
of IoT applications in healthcare that revolutionized diagnosis and 
medical treatment, making these patients’ health much more 
manageable.78 
Cybersecurity risks and threats existed long before the advent of 
IoT, and the argument made by this Article could apply equally to 
IoT and non-IoT environments, since software will have flaws 
regardless of the platform on which it runs. However, the IoT 
ecosystem creates a serious challenge and shakes up some basic 
cybersecurity assumptions – it significantly broadens the attack 
surface that hackers can use, and the level of harm to autonomy is 
also far greater, thus trivializing hacking in general but also making 
it more personal.79 This will result in more opportunistic hacking, 
                                                     
even design the device without any interfaces for patching the software in the first 
place.”). 
76 See generally Andrew Ferguson, The Internet of Things and the Fourth 
Amendment of Effects, 104 CAL. L. REV. 805 (2016). 
77 See Charles McLellan, M2M and the Internet of Things: A Guide, ZDNet (Jan. 
10, 2013), http://www.zdnet.com/article/m2m-and-the-internet-of-things-a-
guide.  
78 See FTC IOT REPORT, supra note 6, at 8. (“connected health devices can 
“improve quality of life and safety by providing a richer source of data to the 
patient’s doctor for diagnosis and treatment[,] . . . improve disease prevention, 
making the healthcare system more efficient and driving costs down[,] . . . [and] 
provide an incredible wealth of data, revolutionizing medical research and 
allowing the medical community to better treat, and ultimately eradicate, 
diseases.”). 
79 Oliver Tavakoli, The Unintended Attack Surface of the Internet of Things, DARK 
READING (Sept. 29, 2015), www.darkreading.com/vulnerabilities---threats/the-
unintended-attack-surface-of-the-internet-of-things/a/d-id/1322393 (“[T]he 
combination of poorly written code and infrequent updates will surely lead to a 
broader and less manageable attack surface.”). See also FTC IOT REPORT, supra 
note 6, at 11 (“[A]s consumers install more smart devices in their homes, they 
may increase the number of vulnerabilities an intruder could use to compromise 
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whereby users’ security or privacy may be compromised for 
potential criminal ends.80  
Law and regulation will find it increasingly difficult to address 
IoT hacking, due to its immense pervasiveness, volume, and trans-
border effects and origins. This will leave the most trivial hacking 
activities unaddressed from a law enforcement perspective.81 The 
argument in this Article, therefore, proposes enhance security by 
fixing vulnerabilities through a legal system that legitimizes the 
activities undertaken by security researchers. These researchers 
employ hacking and reverse-engineering techniques for the purpose 
of identifying security flaws and reporting them to the respective 
vendor and, eventually, the public.  
The following sub-sections elaborate on why the IoT ecosystem 
is particularly challenging in the cybersecurity context – sensors are 
everywhere, processors are operating physical objects, and the 
distinctions between software and hardware are eroding. These IoT-
specific challenges are creating a particularly vulnerable 
environment. 
1. The Ubiquity of Sensors 
The IoT ecosystem is creating a world of ubiquitous sensors.82 
These sensors are the eyes and ears of the Internet, collecting data 
                                                     
personal information.”); La Marca & Paez, The Internet of Things: Emerging 
Legal Issues for Businesses, 43 N. KY. L. REV. 29, 46 (2016) (“As the number of 
Internet-connected objects expands, so too does the potential attack surface. The 
loT faces serious security issues because it is based on interoperability and 
interdependence: more interactions among devices lead to more areas of 
vulnerability.”).  
80 Mihai Lazaresu, Hacked by Your Fridge: the Internet of Things Could Spark a 
New Wave of Cyber Attacks, THE CONVERSATION (Oct. 7, 2016), 
https://theconversation.com/hacked-by-your-fridge-the-internet-of-things-could-
spark-a-new-wave-of-cyber-attacks-66493.  
81 Scholars recognize the limits of law enforcement in the world of computer 
crime. See Anonymous, Immunizing the Internet, Or: How I Learned to Stop 
Worrying and Love the Worm, 119(8) HARV. L. REV. 2442, 2445 (2006) 
(“[C]ybercrime cannot be effectively combated solely with traditional law 
enforcement tools.”).  
82 See Arkady Zaslavsky, Internet of Things and Ubiquitous Sensing, COMPUTER 
(Sept. 2013), 
https://www.computer.org/web/computingnow/archive/september2013 (“With 
billions of ICOs [Internet-connected objects] and a diverse abundance of sensors, 
the IoT will be an enabler of ubiquitous sensing.”). 
 





about the environment and processing and possibly transmitting that 
data elsewhere.83 These sensors are working continuously, and they 
are everywhere. IoT devices enable not only data about direct 
computer use but also data about driving, home heating and cooling, 
food stored in a refrigerator, pulse and blood pressure, sleep 
patterns, and much more.  
These distributed data can tell a lot about a specific person. The 
most private and nonintuitive pieces of information about a user are 
constantly collected by IoT devices and may enable misuse for 
criminal, business, law enforcement, and other purposes.84 The 
richness of data within the IoT ecosystem has also led to law 
enforcement finding this space appealing for surveillance.85  
2. Physicality 
A significant characteristic of IoT is its physicality. Processors 
embedded in IoT devices are tasked to operate actual, physical 
equipment, with tangible consequences in the physical world. Think 
of a smart thermostat, which learns about the preferences of the user 
but is also tasked to turn on or off a piece of equipment – the AC or 
furnace – when certain conditions are met. In this way, the IoT 
device commands the actuator, meaning that any meddling with IoT 
could have physical ramifications due to actuators malfunctioning, 
at times posing danger to physical security. Examples include a 
                                                     
83 See Hakima Chaouchi & Thomas Bourgeau, Internet of Things: From Real to 
Virtual World, in NAVEEN CHILAMKURTI, SHERALI ZEADALLY, HAKIMA 
CHAOUCHI (EDS.), NEXT-GENERATION WIRELESS TECHNOLOGIES: 4G AND 
BEYOND 161, 173 (2013) (listing some examples of data collected by sensors – 
“mechanical data (position, force, pressure), thermal data (temperature, heat 
flow), electrostatic or magnetic field, radiation intensity (electromagnetic, 
nuclear), chemical data (humidity, ion, gas concentration), and biological data 
(toxicity, presence of bio organisms)”). 
84 See Symantec, Internet Security Threat Report Vol. 21, 16 (Apr. 2016), 
https://www.symantec.com/content/dam/symantec/docs/reports/istr-21-2016-
en.pdf.  
85 See Andrew Ferguson, The Internet of Things and the Fourth Amendment 
Effects, 104 CAL. L. REV. 805, 810 (2016) (“The Internet of Things offers new 
surveillance possibilities that do not involve any physical intrusion into the object. 
As currently designed, these objects radiate data trails quite useful for law 
enforcement tracking.”). 
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vehicle not responding to its driver’s actions, a disabled insulin 
pump, and a garage door that won’t open. 
In other words, today’s everyday objects are creating 
telecommunications problems that challenge notions of security and 
privacy. These challenges are similar whether we talk about 
healthcare equipment, household objects, or transportation. The 
effects, however, may be tremendously different – a malfunctioning 
pacemaker could lead to death, whereas a disabled wearable 
smartwatch is a matter of inconvenience or, at most, a privacy 
violation. 
3. Software and Hardware Distinction  
Although the growing role and share of software in the overall 
IoT environment cannot be overstated, hardware also poses a host 
of challenges to the security and privacy associated with IoT.86 For 
example, researchers at the University of Michigan have recently 
learned that a CPU manufactured in China had a backdoor built by 
design into the CPU.87 This enables a small portion of the CPU to 
be used as an entryway for malware, which can then obtain control 
over the device. Since IoT devices have CPUs embedded in them, 
this represents an actual threat to the integrity and resilience of IoT.  
From a security and privacy perspective, both the software and 
the hardware need to be regulated and monitored for potential 
vulnerabilities that could affect the normal functioning of a device. 
Regulatory agencies in the U.S. are increasingly focusing their 
efforts on software, which many believe will be “eating the world” 
and taking over the digital sphere. But even if this prediction is 
accurate, hardware may still be designed in a way that allows 
exploitation, particularly if it is under-regulated due to the appeal of 
software regulation. Hardware represents an even bigger “black-
                                                     
86 See Andy Greenberg, Forget Software – Now Hackers Are Exploiting Physics, 
WIRED (Aug. 31, 2016), https://www.wired.com/2016/08/new-form-hacking-
breaks-ideas-computers-work (“The trick works by running a program on the 
target computer, which repeatedly overwrites a certain row of transistors in its 
DRAM flash memory, “hammering” it until a rare glitch occurs: Electric charge 
leaks from the hammered row of transistors into an adjacent row. The leaked 
charge then causes a certain bit in that adjacent row of the computer's memory to 
flip from one to zero or vice versa. That bit flip gives you access to a privileged 
level of the computer's operating system.”). 
87 See Kaiyuan Yang, Matthew Hicks, Qing Dong, Todd Austin, Dennis Sylvester, 
A2: Analog Malicious Hardware, 2016 IEEE SYMPOSIUM ON SECURITY AND 
PRIVACY, available at http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7546493.  





box” problem, since it is extremely time consuming and complicated 
to determine how a specific computer component works, whereas 
software is relatively easier to grasp – as security researchers have 
demonstrated recently. Therefore, the analysis provided by this 
Article, while focusing mostly on software, could still be applicable 
to security research into hardware.  
c. The Threats of IoT 
The characteristics of sensor abundancy and general physicality 
of IoT lead us to a third attribute, which is particularly alarming. IoT 
devices are not typically manufactured with robust or even minimal 
security standards (technical, and possibly mechanical). The IoT 
market failure results in vendors not implementing security in their 
IoT devices, mostly due to competition – in other words, in order to 
reduce manufacturing costs and offer a cheaper product. On the 
other hand, the average consumer does not typically demand strong 
security features, most likely due to informational gaps. 
This suggests that IoT unsecurity is a global problem, since the 
same security-lacking devices would be present in the U.S. just as 
in other parts of the world. Regardless, the U.S. has an important 
role to play from a legal perspective by setting robust standards and 
best practices for the rest of the world to follow, including the ethical 
hacking of IoT devices advanced by this paper. In addition, many 
IoT vendors are based in the U.S. and so fall under the jurisdiction 
of U.S. laws and regulations, and so ethical hacking within the U.S. 
would secure both domestic devices as well as those that are 
exported to elsewhere in the world. 
The IoT revolution comes with a price. While the ability of 
everyday objects to connect to the Internet offers a broad range of 
advantages, it also poses a set of specific challenges, stemming from 
the vulnerabilities that these devices have almost by default. The 
literature generally identifies three major threats with today’s IoT 
ecosystem – privacy, individual user security, and third-party 
security.88 
                                                     
88 See Sir Mark Walport, The Internet of Things: Making the Most of the Second 
Digital Revolution, UK GOV’T OFF. FOR SCI., 15 no. 3 (Dec. 2014), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/4
09774/ 14-1230-internet-of-things-review.pdf. Also, see FTC IOT REPORT, supra 
note 6, p. 10 – (Where the FTC identifies these three threats, providing that 
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First, since IoT sensors collect data about their respective users 
and their environment, unauthorized actors may attempt to access 
that personal information for a variety of reasons. Having security 
features within an IoT device could make it much harder for these 
unauthorized actors to access personal information. However, 
privacy breaches could then still be committed by vendors and other 
third parties who seek to monetize the collected data, which could 
also be labeled as a privacy risk. 
Second, malicious actors may try to hack into IoT devices and 
meddle with the functionality of the device. For example, hackers 
may decide to shut down a car’s engine,89 lock a hotel room while 
demanding ransom,90 or disable a pacemaker.91 These are security 
risks confined to the user. 
Third, IoT devices may be used individually (a single IoT 
device) or collectively (an “army” of compromised IoT devices) to 
facilitate an attack or breach targeting another computer system.92 
In this case, the IoT is used merely as a proxy, which allows the 
hacker to have more disruptive power (if multiple IoT devices are 
used for a specific attack) and to mask her or his identity. This is the 
manifestation of the externalities discussed supra. For example, a 
hundred thousand compromised IoT devices were used to mount a 
distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack against Domain Name 
                                                     
unsecure IoT is – “(1) enabling unauthorized access and misuse of personal 
information, (2) facilitating attacks on other systems, and (3) creating physical 
safety risks.”) 
89 See Craig Timberg, Hacks on the Highway, WASHINGTON POST (July 22, 2015), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/business/2015/07/22/hacks-on-the-highway.  
90 See Josephine Wolff, The Ransomware Attack That Locked Hotel Guests Out 
of Their Rooms, SLATE (Feb. 1, 2017), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2017/02/the_ransomware
_attack_that_locked_hotel_guests_out_of_their_rooms.html.  
91 See Morie Moe, Go Ahead, Hackers. Break My Heart, WIRED (Mar. 14, 2016), 
https://www.wired.com/2016/03/go-ahead-hackers-break-heart.  
92 See FTC IoT Report, supra note 6, at 12. (“[A] compromised loT device could 
be used to launch a denial of service attack. Denial of service attacks are more 
effective the more devices the attacker has under his or her control; as loT devices 
proliferate, vulnerabilities could enable these attackers to assemble large numbers 
of devices to use in such attacks. Another possibility is that a connected device 
could be used to send malicious emails.”). 
 





System (DNS) provider Dyn.93 The Dyn attack made it impossible 
for Internet users to access websites like Twitter, Netflix, and 
Reddit.94 This is a security risk against third parties – against the 
Internet. 
1. User Privacy  
IoT devices often generate data about the consumer, which 
raises the risk of these data being compromised. Many consumers 
would not be able to differentiate between an Internet-connected 
object and its offline counterpart in terms of the potential privacy 
implications. Data collected by IoT devices may pose a host of 
privacy concerns. For example, in the case of an IoT device used to 
measure blood alcohol – the Breathometer – collected data may 
impact “employment decisions, criminal liability implications, and 
health, life, car insurance ramifications.”95 The data collection, 
retention, and disposal policies of a specific manufacturer are not 
always communicated to the consumer in a transparent and 
accessible manner.96 This is of course not unique to the 
Breathometer, as other IoT devices collect sensitive personal data as 
well.  
These problematic uses of personal information are not the end 
of the story. Certain devices might require the use of payment 
methods and passwords, which could be accessed and misused by 
cyber criminals seeking financial gain.97 If this sensitive information 
is not properly secured, the number of vulnerabilities and 
                                                     
93 See Scott Hilton, Dyn Analysis Summary of Friday October 21 Attack, 
VANTAGEPOINT DYN COMPANY NEWS, https://dyn.com/blog/dyn-analysis-
summary-of-friday-october-21-attack/. 
94 See Schneier, supra note 2. 
95 See Scott Peppet, Regulating the Internet of Things: First Steps Towards 
Managing Discrimination, Privacy, Security & Conesnt, 93 TEX. L. REV. 85, 90 
(2014). 
96 See Peppet, supra note 95, at 90 (“[M]any ‘things’ have little in their external 
form that suggests they are connected to the Internet. When you grab an Internet-
connected scarf from the coat rack or sit on an Internet connected chair, should 
you have some obvious sign that data will be transmitted or an action triggered?”) 
(citing ADRIAN MCEWEN & HAKIM CASSIMALLY, DESIGNING THE INTERNET OF 
THINGS 294 (2014)). 
97 See Roey Tzezana, Scenarios for Crime and Terrorist Attacks Using The 
Internet Of Things, 4(18) EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF FUTURES RESEARCH 17 (2016).  
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compromises will increase, exposing personal information to 
malicious actors. 
Another major problem that is currently emerging in the privacy 
law scholarship is sensor fusion98 – when innocuous and seemingly 
insignificant data collected by an individual IoT sensor could be 
used to make inferences about the user when paired with data 
collected from other IoT sensors. Collectively, the data could be 
used to make near-certain inferences about the user, though the 
individual pieces of data would have no meaning on their own. This 
could be used to make powerful inferences about the user. For 
example, data from a smartphone’s gyroscope could be used to 
determine the driving habits of a user; when paired with an IoT 
pacemaker, the combination of these data can yield an inference 
about the emotional state and mood of the user.99 Scholars identify 
a long list of inferences that would be possible under the emerging 
IoT ecosystem of data collection – “a user’s mood; stress levels; 
personality type; bipolar disorder; demographics (e.g., gender, 
marital status, job status, age); smoking habits; overall wellbeing; 
progression of Parkinson’s disease; sleep patterns; happiness; levels 
of exercise; and types of physical activity or movement.”100 
Considering how personal and sensitive some of these data are, IoT 
devices should allow for stronger security to prevent breaches that 
could be devastating to users.  
Daniel Solove calls this problem “data aggregation” and argues 
that, “[v]iewed in isolation, each piece of our day-to-day 
information is not all that telling; viewed in combination, it begins 
to paint a portrait about our personalities.”101 The bottom line is that 
malicious actors have many methods of abusing private information 
                                                     
98 See Peppet, supra note 95, at 118–24 (“Sensor fusion is the combining of sensor 
data from different sources to create a resulting set of information that is better 
than if the information is used separately.”). 
99 See Poudel, supra note 7, at 1013. 
100 See Peppet, supra note 7, at 113. 
101 See Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy and 
the Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1185 (2002) (“Viewed in isolation, each 
piece of our day-to-day information is not all that telling; viewed in combination, 
it begins to paint a portrait about our personalities. The aggregation problem arises 
from the fact that the digital revolution has enabled information to be easily 
amassed and combined. Even information in public records that is superficial or 
incomplete can be quite useful in obtaining more data about individuals. 
Information breeds information.”). 
 





they collect without authorization, particularly if they can collect 
that information across multiple IoT devices.  
It must be noted that many of the data described in this sub-
section would not be considered personally identifiable information 
(PII), which, if compromised, imposes notification responsibilities 
on vendors. However, PII does not typically include sensor data, or 
anonymized data, which is often re-identifiable.102 This difficulty 
seems to suggest that the focus at present should be on enhancing 
IoT security until federal and state regulations address the full 
breadth of data that ought to be protected by vendors. At present, 
relying on state laws regulating notification of data breaches would 
not necessarily solve the problem of sensor fusion. 
2. User Security 
Vulnerabilities in a specific device may facilitate potential 
exploitations against that specific device and, consequently, its user. 
The primary target in this case is not the data in the device but rather 
the device’s functionality. For example, a hacker may decide to 
attack a thermostat using a ransomware method, meaning that the 
user will be unable to use the thermostat until she or he pays the 
ransom.103 The data are not the primary interest for the hacker here 
– whereas disrupting the normal functioning of the device is. This 
hack is also enabled by weak security standards and vulnerabilities 
in software. 
Recently, an Austrian hotel suffered a ransomware attack 
targeting its smart-locks. The attack locked up hotel rooms until the 
hotel gave up and paid the ransom in order to restore the functioning 
of the locks. In that case, hackers did not care about who used the 
locks, or how, or when.104  
                                                     
102 See Alexander Tran, The Internet of Things and Potential Remedies in Privacy 
Tort Law, 50 COLUM. J. L. SOC. PROB. 263, 275-276 (2017) (arguing that many 
state laws are not dealing with sensor data, which may be re-identifiable, with 
Texas’ statute being one of the only exceptions, providing a broad definition to 
“sensitive personal information”). 
103 See Dan Raywood, #DefCon: Thermostat Control Hacked to Host 
Ransomware, INFO SECURITY (Aug. 7, 2016), https://www.infosecurity-
magazine.com/news/defcon-thermostat-control-hacked. 
104 See Wolff (Slate), supra note 90.  
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User security may take a more serious form if the target is a life-
sustaining IoT device such as the pacemaker. In fact, security 
researchers revealed recently that pacemakers have 19 security 
vulnerabilities and are plagued with as many as 8,600 security 
flaws.105 In addition, security researchers were able to hack into 
insulin pumps and disable their medicine delivery settings.106 
Potentially, a hacker exploiting one or more of these vulnerabilities 
could cause a life-threatening situation, ranging from a serious 
bodily harm to the user or, in extreme situations, even death.107  
Vulnerable IoT devices could also be used to access the network 
through which they connect to the Internet, which would expose 
other devices on the network to potential compromise. Even if a 
specific vendor employs the strictest security features for their IoT 
devices, that would not necessarily protect all IoT devices within a 
household, as there are many vendors with varying degrees of IoT 
security implementations.108 This is analogous in a way to the Target 
breach, which surprisingly was directed not at Target’s computer 
network but rather at a contractor who had weaker data-protection 
standards. That hack resulted in forty million credit cards being 
stolen in one of the biggest data breaches in recent years.109 
The bottom line is that a compromise to user security can range 
in its effects from inconvenience, such as the device being slowed 
                                                     
105 See Swati Khandelwal, Over 8,600 Vulnerabilities Found in Pacemakers, THE 
HACKER NEWS (Jun. 5, 2017), http://thehackernews.com/2017/06/pacemaker-
vulnerability.html. See also Keith Collins, Pacemakers Have Thousands of 
Vulnerabilities Hackers Can Exploit, Study Finds, QUARTZ (June 3, 2017), 
https://qz.com/997803/pacemakers-have-thousands-of-vulnerabilities-hackers-
can-exploit-study-finds/.  
106 See FTC IOT REPORT, supra note 6, at 12. 
107 See Lily Newman, Medical Devices Are The Next Security Nightmare, WIRED 
(Mar. 2, 2017), https://www.wired.com/2017/03/medical-devices-next-security-
nightmare (“That in turn could mean the theft of sensitive medical records, or a 
devastating ransomware attack that holds vital systems hostage until 
administrators pay up. ‘The entire extortion landscape has changed,’ says Ed 
Cabrera, chief cybersecurity officer at the threat research firm Trend Micro. ‘You 
do get into this life or death situation potentially.’”). 
108 See Poudel, supra note 7, at 1015. 
109 Paul Ziobro, Target Breach Began with Contractor’s Electronic Billing Link, 
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 6, 2014). See also Brian Krebs, Email Attack on Vendor Set Up 









down, to complete disruption of the device, to a life-threatening 
situation, depending on the targeted device, motivation, and the 
method of exploitation employed.  
3. Third-Party Security  
The proliferation of IoT creates an environment of potentially 
millions of vulnerable devices. This enables hackers to create 
enslaved IoT devices that can be used as a proxy for attacking third 
parties – commonly referred to as “botnets.”110 Botnets are 
essentially armies of Internet-connected devices compromised 
through a malware that infects them and allows the attacker (the “bot 
master”) to command that group of devices. The most intuitive form 
of third-party security risk due to IoT botnets is a DDoS attack. The 
key in a DDoS attack (as opposed to a DoS attack) is in the 
overwhelming volume of requests, which essentially shuts down the 
target due to its unavailable bandwidth for responding to legitimate 
requests of service.  
In October 2016, a malware named Mirai created a botnet out of 
a hundred thousand compromised IoT devices used it to mount a 
DDoS attack against a Domain Name System (DNS) service 
provider, Dyn.111 DNS is the basic protocol that translates 
alphanumerical addresses (www.nytimes.com, for example) to 
numerical IP addresses (like 192.168.1.182), which are then 
translated into a computer’s binary language in blocks of eight bits 
(11000000 10101000 00000001 10110110). The Internet’s TCP/IP 
protocol works with binary addresses, which it “understands,” 
whereas alphanumerical addresses are a convention that enables 
humans to conveniently browse the Internet without having to 
memorize a list of numerical IP addresses. This structure is an easy 
target for a malicious actor who wishes to shut down portions of the 
World Wide Web and make it impossible for the average user to 
access websites and services online.  
II. THE SECURITY RESEARCH ENVIRONMENT 
                                                     
110 A botnet that recently caused significant unrest is Mirai, which is also the name 
of the malware that allowed the organization of this botnet. See Lily Hay 
Newman, The Botnet That Broke the Internet Isn’t Going Away, WIRED (Dec. 9, 
2016), https://www.wired.com/2016/12/botnet-broke-internet-isnt-going-away.  
111 See Dyn Statement, supra note 18.  
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In cybersecurity, it is essential to understand the enemy in order 
to resolve the threats and challenges that exist largely due to certain 
forms of hacking. Hacking tends to have a negative connotation – it 
frequently implies malevolent, possibly illegal, activity in relation 
to computers and networks.112 But hacking culture is more diverse 
than that. Criminally motivated hackers, or “black hat hackers,” are 
only a subset of the larger group of hackers – in fact, a tiny 
proportion, only about 1%.113 Hackers tend to have different 
motivations, purposes, and incentives, ranging from seeking a thrill 
or challenge, or resolving and fixing vulnerabilities, to extorting a 
user, disrupting the functioning of computers and networks, stealing 
data and credentials, and potentially selling the data or 
vulnerabilities in a designated marketplace on the Internet. 
Similarly, people tinker with their devices for a variety of 
reasons – for fun, to study, or to fix vulnerabilities and weaknesses, 
but also for criminal and destructive purposes.114 More importantly, 
hackers have a clear advantage over vendors when it comes to 
finding vulnerabilities.115 While a vendor may be focused on other 
tasks, hackers can dedicate their time to further study a specific 
system and identify its flaws. Hackers also tend to have the cutting-
edge knowledge that allows them to reveal vulnerabilities in creative 
ways. Considering that it is far easier to attack than to defend in 
cyberspace – the attacker needs to know of only one vulnerability, 
while the defender has to defend against all possible attacks – 
provides yet another argument in favor of ethical hacking for 
security purposes.116 Efficient cyber-defense strategies, therefore, 
have to rely on a robust cybersecurity research environment, which 
involves hacking.117 
                                                     
112 See Cassandra Kirsch, The Grey Hat Hacker: Reconciling Cyberspace Reality 
and the Law, 41 N. KY. L. J. 383, 385 (2014) (explaining that “not all hacking is 
created equal”). 
113 See Robert Hahn & Anne Layne-Farrar, The Law and Economics of Software 
Security, 30 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 283, 296 (2006). 
114 See Samuelson, supra note 10, at 564. See also William W. Fisher III, The 
Implication for Law of User Innovation, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1417, 1455–72 (2010).  
115 See Bambauer, supra note 34, at 1062.  
116 See LILLIAN ABLON ET AL., MARKETS FOR CYBERCRIME TOOLS AND STOLEN 
DATA: HACKERS’ BAZAAR 31 (2014). 
117 See Kesan, & Hayes, supra note 73, at 786. 
 





This section will explain the three main categories of hackers, 
which may assist in the further analysis of the “freedom to hack.” 
These categories are typically assigned a color – white, gray, or 
black. These colors reflect the morality of the hacking – which may 
also suggest its legality, though the two are not mutually 
dependent.118 As this section demonstrates, the boundary between 
legitimate and illegitimate hacking is somewhat fuzzy,119 given that 
both ethical and criminal hackers are utilizing the same techniques, 
and at first blush, in the absence of context, it is hard to differentiate 
between the two.120 Law enforcement and courts are not always well 
equipped to make this normative determination,121 and this Article 
therefore argues that differentiating between ethical and unethical 
hackers depends on whether the hacker in question exploited a 
vulnerability and whether procedures of vulnerability disclosure 
were followed. This will be further discussed in Section IV.  
a. White Hat 
White-hat hackers are security researchers whose main 
motivation is to improve software and hardware by revealing 
vulnerabilities and security flaws and disclosing them in a way that 
will ensure they are patched. White-hat hackers, when not employed 
by the vendors themselves, are motivated only sometimes by 
financial gain (the expectation of being monetarily rewarded); more 
often they are motivated by the challenge, or by the genuine belief 
that improving the quality of software and hardware will make 
Internet security stronger.  
For an illustration of how white hats are improving the 
security of the broader Internet infrastructure, we can look to Mike 
Lynn, a security researcher then affiliated with Internet Security 
Systems, who discovered a serious software flaw in Cisco’s 
                                                     
118 See Kesan & Hayes, supra note 73, at 769–70 (suggestingethics and morality 
axes for hackers).  
119 See Thompson, supra note 13, at 556.  
120 See Nancy Gohring, Digital Vigilantes: Hacking for a Good Cause, 
PCWORLD (Dec. 25, 2007), http://www.pcworld.com/article/140731/article.html 
(explaining how a Trojan horse was used to uncover child-porn activities).  
121 In section IV, I will propose certain recommendations that could alleviate some 
of the difficulties introduced in the current section.  
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routers.122 Although Lynn reported the vulnerability to Cisco, he 
was still threatened with legal action because he planned on 
presenting some of the information to his peers at a security 
conference.123 The gravity of this flaw was characterized then as a 
ticking bomb endangering the very backbone of the Internet.124 
Certain commentators believe that the notion separating 
white hats from other hackers is that white hats act under 
authorization.125 Another distinction made in literature is based on 
disclosure: hackers disclosing vulnerabilities directly to the vendor 
are white hats, while those who publicize vulnerabilities to the 
broader public are considered gray or black hats.126 
Given that white hats’ motivation is primarily the drive to 
enhance security, it seems unreasonable to subject these individuals 
to legal liability, assuming that cybersecurity is in the interest of the 
broader public and possibly the international community. It would 
be best, therefore, to define white hats as hackers who seek to 
improve security while minimizing possible harm to the vulnerable 
target by neither exploiting the vulnerability nor selling it to 
malicious actors.127 
b. Black Hat 
Black-hat hacking is the exact opposite of the white-hat 
approach. Indeed, black hats are hackers motivated by mischief or 
profit rather than by actually fixing vulnerabilities and security 
flaws.128 The ability to anonymize one’s identity on the Internet 
allows for the proliferation of black hat hackers (or 
“cybercriminals”), which lowers the risks of detection and 
                                                     
122 See Bambauer, supra note 34, at 1053. 
123 Bruce Schneier, Cisco Harasses Security Researcher, SCHNEIER ON SECURITY 
(July 29, 2005), 
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/07/cisco_harasses.html.  
124 See Kim Zetter, Router Flaw Is a Ticking Bomb, WIRED (Aug. 1, 2005), 
https://www.wired.com/2005/08/router-flaw-is-a-ticking-bomb.  
125 See Thompson , supra note 13, at 557.  
126 See Thompson, supra note 13, at 557.  
127 See Thompson, supra note 13, at 558.  
128 Reid Skibell, Cybercrimes & Misdemeanors: A Reevaluation of the Computer 
Fraud & Abuse Act, 18 BERK. TECH. L. J. 909, 919-921 (2003).  
 





prosecution compared to the physical world.129 Data suggest that 
law enforcement is usually reluctant to investigate, apprehend, and 
prosecute cybercriminals, given that hackers often reside overseas, 
which presents challenges with regard to jurisdiction and gathering 
evidence.130  
Certain commentators make the argument that even though 
black hats are essentially cybercriminals, the law should still allow 
them to operate freely, since they can expose flaws and 
vulnerabilities that could have been exploited in more harmful ways, 
such as through terrorism or state-sponsored attacks.131 However, 
the analysis in this Article will exclude black-hat hackers, since their 
primary intention is not enhancing security. 
c. Gray Hat 
Hackers’ ethics and motivations are not binary but rather 
could be placed somewhere on the black–white continuum. The gray 
area in which hackers operate with unclear motivations is fittingly 
labeled as “gray hat.”132 As an example, gray hats will still identify 
vulnerabilities, but, rather than disclosing them to the vendor, they 
might sell them to governments, intelligence agencies, or law 
enforcement authorities.133 The buyer, in turn, uses the vulnerability 
for a variety of purposes, such as for espionage, military, or law 
enforcement ends.134 The primary intention of gray hats is not 
necessarily enhancing security, although that could be one 
motivation – it is the desire to monetize vulnerabilities by selling 
them to official entities other than the vendor. It is difficult to tell 
whether gray hats are included or excluded from the scope of the 
argument in this Article, since that largely depends on their 
                                                     
129 See Thompson, supra note 13, at 548. 
130 Susan Brenner, Cybercrime Metric: Old Wine, New Bottles? 9(13) VA. J. L. & 
TECH. 6–11 (2004).  
131 See Anonymous, supra note 15 (noting that “cybercrime can expose security 
flaws that, if fixed, can prevent more devastating”). 
132 See generally SHON HARRIS, GRAY HAT HACKING THE ETHICAL HACKERS 
HANDBOOK (2008). 
133 See Kim Zetter, Hacker Lexicon: What Are White Hat, Gray Hat, and Black 
Hat Hackers? WIRED (Apr. 13, 2016), https://www.wired.com/2016/04/hacker-
lexicon-white-hat-gray-hat-black-hat-hackers.  
134 See Zetter (Hacker Lexicon), supra note 133.  
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motivations and the precise nature of their activities. But assuming 
the gray-hat hacker in question follows the procedure of 
vulnerability disclosure and minimization of harm to third parties, 
they ought to be in the clear in terms of legal liability. 
d. The Vulnerability Market 
When considering a freedom to hack, it is also important to 
understand the incentives and realities of the “black-hat” 
vulnerability market.135 In this market, hackers sell what are 
typically known as “zero-day exploits,” meaning that vendors are 
unaware of these vulnerabilities in their systems, and therefore the 
chance of them getting patched is relatively low.136 Governments, 
intelligence agencies, militaries, and cybercriminals find this black 
market for vulnerabilities very appealing, and hackers who end up 
selling vulnerabilities on that market believe that they are better off 
doing so rather than disclosing them to the respective vendor.137  
In the digital era, knowing of a vulnerability can be either a 
weapon or a shield. Legalizing ethical hacking could be an incentive 
to use that knowledge as a shield while reducing the likelihood that 
researchers will sell vulnerabilities on the black market. In many 
respects, the legal challenges demonstrated in Section III of this 
Article create an incentive for researchers to sell vulnerabilities on 
the black market, rather than to disclose them to the relevant parties, 
for fear of legal jeopardy.138 The result makes individual users less 
safe and creates a serious danger to the Internet as a whole, 
considering that critical infrastructure and other public services may 
be running software with exploitable vulnerabilities of which the 
vendor has no knowledge. 
At the same time, there are white-hat vulnerability markets, 
which are often referred to as “bug bounty” programs, facilitated by 
the vendors themselves. These markets create incentives for security 
researchers by offering monetary rewards for reports of 
                                                     
135 Bruce Schneier, The Vulnerabilities Market and the Future of Security, FORBES 
(May 30, 2012), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bruceschneier/2012/05/30/the-
vulnerabilities-market-and-the-future-of-security/#696438d77536.  
136 Andy Greenberg, New Dark-Web Market is Selling Zero-Day Exploits to 
Hackers, WIRED (Apr. 17, 2015), https://www.wired.com/2015/04/therealdeal-
zero-day-exploits.  
137 See Bambauer, supra note 34, at 1067.  
138 See Bambauer, supra note 34, at 1054. 
 





vulnerabilities made directly to the vendors under predetermined 
conditions. Their purpose is to create a greater incentive for security 
researchers to cooperate with vendors in order to prevent 
vulnerabilities from being sold to potentially malicious actors – 
criminal hackers and hostile governments.139 
e. Accountability in the IoT Industry 
Allowing ethical hackers to freely snoop for vulnerabilities 
and flaws could facilitate a more accountable IoT industry: 
manufacturers will patch reported vulnerabilities and attempt to 
improve their products in a way that provides reasonable security, 
and therefore data privacy, in order to avoid negative publicity. The 
ethical hacking community is usually ahead of regulatory efforts to 
set standards for industries, which potentially allows for a more 
efficient and informed security atmosphere.  
Regulatory agencies are slowly beginning to realize the 
immense potential of exposing IoT vulnerabilities with the help of 
the hacker community. This allows the industry to patch 
vulnerabilities before malicious actors can exploit them for criminal, 
political, or challenge-driven ends. The FTC has recently announced 
an IoT challenge to “combat security vulnerabilities in home 
devices,”140 offering a monetary reward for a tool that would 
enhance IoT security in the form of a “physical device that the 
consumer can add to his or her home network that would check and 
install updates for other IoT devices on that home network, or it 
might be an app or cloud-based service, or a dashboard or other user 
interface.”141 However, this effort is still not actively encouraging 
ethical hacking; rather, it encourages innovation. At the same time, 
the FTC has also become an enforcer of cybersecurity and privacy, 
                                                     
139 See Jay Kesan & Carol Hayes, Bugs in the Market: Creating a Legitimate, 
Transparent, and Vendor-Focused Market for Software Vulnerabilities, 58 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 753, 759 (2016) (creating a distinction between white, black, and gray 
vulnerability markets).  
140 See FTC Announces Internet of Things Challenge to Combat Security 
Vulnerabilities in Home Devices, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (Jan. 4, 2017), 
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2017/01/ftc-announces-internet-
things-challenge-combat-security.  
141 See FTC Challenge to Combat Security Vulnerabilities in Home Devices, 
supra note 140.  
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under Section 5(a) of the FTC Act.142 In the future, the FTC may 
play an active part in ensuring that vendors address vulnerabilities 
reported to them in a reasonable and timely manner. 
III. THE FREEDOM TO HACK 
Individuals tinker with their devices for many reasons, including 
for the challenge, to learn how the system works, or for diagnostic 
and repair purposes.143 The freedom to tinker is important for 
innovation and creativity, and, as the next sub-sections will analyze, 
for the enhancement of security. Ensuring more ownership rights to 
consumers of otherwise copyrighted objects is not only a legalistic 
concept but an actual advocacy movement. For example, the 
Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), a nonprofit organization, is a 
strong proponent of a broad right to tinker, giving consumers more 
flexibility and autonomy and protecting civil liberties in the digital 
world. The ideology behind the movement is the belief that 
technology helps develop and protect civil rights and liberties like 
freedom of expression, privacy, and activism.144  
Edward Felten notes that tinkering is not only a natural part of 
property rights, which the owner possesses, but an exercise in 
defining the relationship between the user and digital devices as “our 
experience is mediated through these devices.”145 Although 
tinkering is seemingly intuitively part of ownership, it has largely 
not been formally legally recognized.146 When the law has addressed 
tinkering, it has mostly been framed under the “permission culture,” 
which permits tinkering only under very limited and narrow 
                                                     
142 15 USC §45(a)(1). See generally Chris Jay Hoofnagle, FTC Regulation of 
Cybersecurity and Surveillance, IN THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF 
SURVEILLANCE LAW (David Gray and Stephen Henderson, eds.) (Cambridge 
University Press 2017). 
143 See Samuelson, supra note 10, at 564. 
144 See About EFF, https://www.eff.org/about.  
145 Edward Felten, The New Freedom to Tinker Movement, FREEDOM TO TINKER 
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146 See Andrew Torrance & Eric Von Hippel, The Right to Innovate, 2015 MICH. 
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circumstances.147 Any deviation from this has generally been 
considered a prohibited criminal activity.148 
Court cases on the freedom to tinker reach as far as the U.S. 
Supreme Court, which, in the recent Impression Products v. 
Lexmark International, allowed consumers to tinker with and reuse 
their printer cartridges without facing patent infringement charges, 
highlighting that this freedom is part of “the rights that come along 
with ownership”149 and that “the buyer is free and clear of an 
infringement lawsuit” in such circumstances.150 
Many have been advocating for a broad freedom to tinker 
with otherwise copyright-protected hardware and software. The EFF 
and other non-profit organizations have long pushed for a right to 
tinker with rightfully owned hardware and software, framing it as a 
broader “digital freedom.”151 In the past, consumers could reverse-
engineer and research their devices, but nowadays, Section 1201 of 
the DMCA, which prohibits circumvention of Technical Protection 
Measures (TPMs), as well as the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 
(CFAA) and wiretap laws have hampered that ability.152 
The freedom to tinker encompasses many dimensions – it 
allows for the intellectual freedom to learn more about different 
objects in our lives.153 In this Article, I wish to introduce a subset of 
the freedom to tinker – the freedom to hack.  
By freedom to hack, I mean that the law, along with the 
institutions that interpret, apply, and enforce it, should recognize the 
benefits of security research (or ethical hacking). This mostly 
includes research into vulnerabilities in software, hardware, and 
networks with the intent of fixing these flaws and making the system 
                                                     
147 See Felten (Movement of Freedom to Tinker), supra note 145. 
148 See Samuelson, supra note 10, at 566. 
149 Impression Products v. Lexmark International, 581 U.S. __ (2017). 
150 Impression Products v. Lexmark International, 581 U.S. __ (2017). 
151 Kit Walsh, Digital Freedom Depends on the Right to Tinker, ELECTRONIC 
FRONTIER FOUNDATION (Jan. 20, 2016), 
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less susceptible to malicious hacking and more secure overall. 
Therefore, to some extent, security researchers or hacking-savvy 
individuals should be able to hack and snoop for vulnerabilities and 
weaknesses in order to make computer systems and networks 
stronger by exposing these flaws. There is an ongoing debate over 
how to disclose vulnerabilities and software flaws, and I will discuss 
it further in Part IV of this Article.  
The freedom to hack, only a small part of the freedom to 
tinker, focuses on one important dimension – the right to expose and 
disclose vulnerabilities to the vendor without being subjected to 
civil or criminal penalties. This does not entail an unrestricted right 
to hack. The law will still have to restrict hacking that causes serious 
harm to third parties (such as privacy violations), which should be 
treated under a criminal liability regime154 or tort law.155 Rather, 
there should be an intellectual freedom to use methods of hacking to 
fix and improve software and hardware, with a robust distinction 
between constructive and destructive (i.e., exploitative) hacking.156 
Many tech companies, and even governmental authorities, 
actively encourage ethical hacking of their systems and provide 
what are referred to as “bug bounties,” through which they invite 
hackers to test their systems for vulnerabilities and to report any 
possible flaws in exchange for monetary compensation.157 However, 
                                                     
154 See Samuelson, supra note 10, at 567. 
155 See Art. 652B of the 2nd Restatement of the Law on Torts (1977) (“One who 
intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of 
another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for 
invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable 
person.”). See generally Art. 652D (“[O]ne who gives publicity to a matter 
concerning the private life of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion 
of his privacy, if the matter publicized is of a kind that (a) would be highly 
offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is not of legitimate concern to the 
public.”); Alexander Tran, The Internet of Things and Potential Remedies in 
Privacy Tort Law, 50 COLUM. J. L. SOC. PROB. 263, 265 (2017) (where author 
argues common law privacy torts, particularly “disclosure of private facts” and 
“intrusion upon seclusion,” could provide some remedy to the privacy harms 
enabled by the IoT ecosystem).  
156 See Samuelson, supra note 10, at 566 (“a right to repair that which is broken 
and make other uses of artifact as long as one is not harming the interests of others) 
p. 568.  
157 See, e.g., Google Vulnerability Reward Program (VRP) Rules, GOOGLE 
https://www.google.com/about/appsecurity/reward-program (providing the list of 
potential vulnerability types and their respective compensation, e.g., Google will 
pay $31,337 for a remote code execution type of vulnerability, if disclosed 
 





there are still certain boundaries imposed by bug bounty programs 
in terms of what activities are allowed and prohibited.158 Even when 
no compensation is guaranteed, or no official bug bounty program 
is in place,159 many individual security researchers still engage in 
bug hunting for a variety of reasons.160 This leads to some serious 
tensions. Not all tech companies encourage an active hunt for bugs 
in their software, and some would even be quite unwelcoming of 
any vulnerabilities reported, whether due to reputational or cost-
associated reasons,161 and might claim such vulnerability collection 
to be in violation of the law.162  
With regard to possible circumvention liability, DMCA 
prohibits circumvention of TPMs in copyrighted software, thus 
possibly exposing security researchers to liability. At the same time, 
with regard to criminal liability, the CFAA contains a fair number 
of ambiguous concepts in relation to hacking that, if interpreted in a 
                                                     
according to the program’s rules). See also Microsoft Security TechCenter, 
Microsoft Bounty Programs, https://technet.microsoft.com/en-
us/library/dn425036.aspx (offering specific bug bounty programs to security 
researchers); G. Burningham, The Rise of White Hat Hackers and the Bug Bounty 
Ecosystem, NEWSWEEK (Jan. 31, 2016), 
http://www.newsweek.com/2016/02/12/white-hat-hackers-keep-bug-bounty-
421357.html.  
158 See Kirsch, supra note 112, at 397 (quoting Google’s vulnerability disclosure 
program, which requires that “testing must not violate any law, or disrupt or 
compromise any data that is not your own”).  
159 Many companies do not have a vulnerability disclosure program. See Kirsch, 
supra note 112, at 398.  
160 See Bambauer, supra note 34, at 1066 (listing reasons for security researchers 
engaging in vulnerability hunting – “possible future remuneration, intellectual 
satisfaction, peer recognition, ideological commitment, animus toward a 
particular vendor, and expectations in a larger community of testers”). 
161 See Bambauer, supra note 34, at 1065. 
162 See Jack Detsch, Influencers: Antihacking Law Obstructs Security Research, 
THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (July 14, 2016), available at 
https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Passcode/Passcode-
Influencers/2016/0714/Influencers-Antihacking-law-obstructs-security-research 
(comparing companies with established bug bounty programs to those who opted 
to use the CFAA as a weapon against security researchers, providing the example 
of Justin Shafer, who was arrested by the FBI for allegedly discovering a 
vulnerability in dental office management software, allowing access to the 
information of 22,000 patients, with the vendor arguing that Shafer’s actions 
violated the CFAA).  
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certain light, could expose legitimate security researchers to legal 
jeopardy. Both the DMCA and CFAA challenges will be further 
discussed in the following two sub-sections. 
a. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) 
Computer software, just like any other creative work, is 
protected under copyright law.163 In 1998, Congress enacted the 
DMCA, creating a legal barrier for tinkerers. The DMCA 
implemented the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) 
treaties by creating a legal regime against circumvention of 
TPMs,164 protecting copyrighted works through the criminalization 
of circumvention of these measures.165 
Subsection 1201(a)(1)(A) of the U.S.C. reads, “No person 
shall circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls 
access to a work protected under this title.”166 In this way, Section 
1201 restricts legitimate users from controlling their devices, since 
the IoT environment is ultimately a collection of devices running on 
copyrighted software. This would mean that smart vehicles, 
pacemakers, insulin pumps, thermostats, and any other IoT devices 
are covered by the Section on anti-circumvention, unless an explicit 
exemption is provided by the DMCA, as discussed below.  
Realizing that an absolute exclusion of the right to tinker is 
unreasonable with respect to digital works, the DMCA also provides 
certain exemptions from infringement liability, which will be 
discussed in the following sections. Initially, however, the DMCA 
provided a very narrow exemption from copyright infringement for 
                                                     
163 See Samuelson, supra note 10, at 581.  
164 See Executive Summary Digital Millennium Copyright Act (Section 104 
Report), available at 
https://www.copyright.gov/reports/studies/dmca/dmca_executive.html. Also, for 
an elaborate analysis on the meaning of TPMs, see Ryan Iwahashi, How to 
Circumvent Technological Protection Measures without Violating the DMCA: An 
Examination of Technological Protection Measures under Current Legal 
Standards, 26 BERK. TECH. L. J. 491 (2011).  
165 See Samuelson, supra note 10, at 581.  
166 See 17 U.S. Code § 1201(a)(1)(A). 
 





reverse-engineering of software for the purposes of 
interoperability,167 encryption research,168 and security testing.169 
In addition to the DMCA, users often agree to certain “terms 
of service,”170 which create a contractual obligation vis-à-vis the 
software or hardware vendor, creating another hurdle for users and, 
therefore, security researchers.171 This private ordering restricts 
security researchers because it grants vendors legal tools to stifle 
security research, or any sort of tinkering with their products, purely 
for business reasons, trumping any security concerns.172 
In 2002, for example, HP was allegedly the first company to 
use the DMCA as a weapon against security researchers.173 HP 
threatened to file a lawsuit against software security company 
SnoSoft, which had identified a security flaw in HP’s Tru64 
operating system. HP threatened the researchers by noting that they 
“could be fined up to $500,000 and imprisoned for up to five 
                                                     
167 See 17 U.S. Code § 1201(f)(1) (“Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection 
(a)(1)(A), a person who has lawfully obtained the right to use a copy of a computer 
program may circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls access 
to a particular portion of that program for the sole purpose of identifying and 
analyzing those elements of the program that are necessary to achieve 
interoperability of an independently created computer program with other 
programs, and that have not previously been readily available to the person 
engaging in the circumvention, to the extent any such acts of identification and 
analysis do not constitute infringement under this title.”). 
168 See U.S.C. § 1201(g) (“[I]it is not a violation of that subsection for a person to 
circumvent a technological measure as applied to a copy, phonorecord, 
performance, or display of a published work in the course of an act of good faith 
encryption research.”). 
169 See U.S.C. § 1201(j) (“[It] is not a violation of that subsection for a person to 
engage in an act of security testing.” However, this exemption differs from the 
newly adopted security research exemption, since it required “authorization from 
the owner or operator” of the computer that was accessed.). 
170 The government has previously argued that violating Terms of Service ought 
to be considered a violation of the CFAA, since it is construed as “unauthorized 
access.” See United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449 (C.D. Cal. 2009). 
171 See U.C. Berkeley School of Information Report, supra note 33, at 8–9. 
172 See U.C. Berkeley School of Information Report, supra note 33, at 8–9. 
173 See Declan McCullagh, Security Warning Draws DMCA Threat, CNET (Aug. 
1, 2012), https://www.cnet.com/news/security-warning-draws-dmca-threat.  
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years”174 under the DMCA.175 Eventually, HP had to back down 
from this threat, due to public scrutiny.176 Since then, the DMCA 
has been used against academic researchers, such as when the 
Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) threatened 
Professor Edward Felten. Felten’s paper dealt with breaking the 
Secure Digital Music Initiative (SDMI) and incited the RIAA to 
demand that Felten withdraw his paper from a conference. Felten 
ultimately did so.177 Felten is just one example of many researchers 
who, after disclosing vulnerabilities, receive cease-and-desist letters 
from companies with threats of legal action and explicit demands to 
discontinue any further security research due to the alleged illegality 
of the act.178 
1. The DMCA Exemption for Security Research 
Copyright (or the right to exclude tinkerers) is not an absolute 
legal concept, and certain interests, such as security and privacy, 
should prevail when balanced against the need to protect the rights 
of copyright owners.179 Therefore, the Library of Congress (LoC) 
has a routine procedure – the triennial review – to assess whether 
certain exemptions from copyright (and criminal) liability are 
required in order to ensure that other important interests are 
fulfilled.180 Before discussing the specific exemption within the 
DMCA relevant to IoT, it is essential to understand the triennial 
                                                     
174 Id.  
175 John Leyden, HP Withdraws DMCA Threat, THE REGISTER (Aug. 2, 2002), 
https://www.theregister.co.uk/2002/08/02/hp_withdraws_dmca_threat.  
176 Id.  
177 See Freeman, supra note 289, at 129.  
178 See Zack Whittaker, PwC Sends ‘Cease and Desist’ Letters to Researchers 
Who Found Critical Flaw, ZDNET (Dec. 12, 2016), 
http://www.zdnet.com/article/pwc-sends-security-researchers-cease-and-desist-
letter-instead-of-fixing-security-flaw/.  
179 See Helen Nissenbaum, Where Computer Security Meets National Security, 7 
ETHICS OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 61, 62 (2005) (“Security deserves a place 
alongside privacy, intellectual property, equity, and other values that have been 
vigorously debated in light of developments in and application of digital 
electronic information technologies.”) 
180 See Arielle Singh, Agency Regulation in Copyright Law: Rulemaking Under 
the DMCA and Its Broader Implications, 26 BERK. TECH. L. J. 527, 529 (2011) 
(“When Congress drafted the DMCA, it recognized that it could not predict the 
future technology landscape, and therefore, included the rulemaking process in 
the statutory scheme to create flexibility”).  
 





process, as well as how the world of copyright slowly creeps into 
other territories, such as information security. 
The DMCA created a procedure of triennial review so that 
potential exemptions to the DMCA could be proposed by the 
broader public.181 Parties can claim that they are adversely affected 
by the DMCA’s anti-circumvention rule, and, after public hearing 
and comment, the Registrar of Copyrights submits 
recommendations to the Librarian of Congress, who then determines 
whether to approve the proposed exemptions to the rule.182 For 
example, the Librarian has to assess, among other things, “the 
impact that the prohibition on the circumvention of technological 
measures applied to copyrighted works  has on criticism, 
comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research”183 and 
“such other factors as the Librarian considers appropriate.”184 In 
other words, the DMCA does not directly prescribe security as part 
of what the Librarian has to consider when recognizing new 
exemptions, but it gives the Librarian broad discretion. 
                                                     
181 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C) (“[T]he Librarian of Congress, upon the 
recommendation of the Register of Copyrights, who shall consult with the 
Assistant Secretary for Communications and Information of the Department of 
Commerce and report and comment on his or her views in making such 
recommendation, shall make the determination in a rulemaking proceeding for 
purposes of subparagraph (B) of whether persons who are users of a copyrighted 
work are, or are likely to be in the succeeding 3-year period, adversely affected 
by the prohibition under subparagraph (A) in their ability to make noninfringing 
uses under this title of a particular class of copyrighted works. In conducting such 
rulemaking, the Librarian shall examine—  
(i) the availability for use of copyrighted works;  
(ii) the availability for use of works for nonprofit archival, preservation, and 
educational purposes;  
(iii) the impact that the prohibition on the circumvention of technological 
measures applied to copyrighted works has on criticism, comment, news 
reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research;  
(iv) the effect of circumvention of technological measures on the market for 
or value of copyrighted works; and  
(v) such other factors as the Librarian considers appropriate.”). 
182 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C). 
183 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C)(iii). 
184 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C)(v). 
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In 2015 the LoC authorized an exemption that was no less than 
a breakthrough for the computer security community.185 The 
exemption reads as follows:  
(i) Computer programs, where the circumvention is 
undertaken on a lawfully acquired device or machine on 
which the computer program operates solely for the 
purpose of good-faith security research and does not 
violate any applicable law, including without limitation the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, as amended and 
codified in title 18, United States Code; and provided, 
however, that, except as to voting machines, such 
circumvention is initiated no earlier than 12 months after 
the effective date of this regulation, and the device or 
machine is one of the following:  
(A) A device or machine primarily designed for use by 
individual consumers (including voting machines);  
(B) A motorized land vehicle; or  
(C) A medical device designed for whole or partial 
implantation in patients or a corresponding personal 
monitoring system, that is not and will not be used by 
patients or for patient care.186 
In addition to what could be considered an IoT device – a 
“device or machine designed to be used by individual consumers” – 
the exemption adds two standalone categories: motorized land 
vehicles and medical devices. 
These two sub-categories are there for a reason. Any flaws 
and vulnerabilities in these two types of devices could potentially be 
deadly or at least pose a serious danger to the safety of their users.187 
                                                     
185 See Jack Detsch, The Legal Exemption Making Life Easier For Ethical 
Hackers, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (Dec. 7, 2016), 
https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Passcode/Security-culture/2016/1207/The-
legal-exemption-making-life-easier-for-ethical-hackers.  
186 37 CFR § 201.40 - Exemptions to prohibition against circumvention, § 201.40 
(b)(7).  
187 The FDA in its premarket cybersecurity guidelines for medical devices 
categorizes five types of risks – negligible (inconvenience or temporary 
discomfort); minor (results in temporary injury or impairment not requiring 
professional medical intervention); serious (results in injury or impairment 
requiring professional medical intervention); critical (results in permanent 
impairment or life-threatening injury), and; catastrophic (results in patient death). 
 





Medical devices, including insulin pumps, pacemakers, implantable 
cardioverter defibrillators, and glucose monitors, are prone to 
software flaws, posing an actual and immediate danger to the 
patients using them.188 Only recently the FDA reported that certain 
implantable cardiac devices are vulnerable to attacks, which could 
allow an unauthorized user to control the device and exfiltrate data 
from it.189 Surprisingly, medical devices are ridden with 
vulnerabilities; as already reported, certain insulin pumps190 and 
pacemakers191 are vulnerable to hacking.  
Motorized land vehicles are increasingly computerized and 
connected to the Internet, creating a whole host of vulnerabilities 
that may be fatal. The automobile industry has yet to realize the 
many risks associated with such development in the architecture of 
cars.192 In fact, Wired reported that security researchers were able to 
hack into the entertainment-system computer of a Jeep, letting 
hackers command the vehicle – including steering and braking.193 
This led to Chrysler recalling its 1.4 million vulnerable vehicles in 
order to patch the bug.194 The fact that smart vehicles often have 
                                                     
See Guidance for Industry and Food and Drug Administration Staff - Content of 
Premarket Submissions for Management of Cybersecurity in Medical Devices, at 
17 (Dec. 28, 2016), 
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance
/GuidanceDocuments/ucm482022.pdf.  
188 Section 1201 Rulemaking: Sixth Triennial Proceeding October 2015 
Recommendation of the Register of Copyrights, 378.  
189 FDA, Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities Identified in St. Jude Medical's 
Implantable Cardiac Devices and Merlin@home Transmitter: FDA Safety 
Communication, (Jan. 9, 2017), 
https://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/Safety/AlertsandNotices/ucm535843.htm. 
190 Jim Finkle, J&J Warns Diabetic Patients: Insulin Pumps Vulnerable to 
Hacking, REUTERS (Oct. 4, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-johnson-
johnson-cyber-insulin-pumps-e-idUSKCN12411L.  
191 See Khandelwal, supra note 105. 
192 See U.C. Berkeley School of Information Report, supra note 33, at 3. 
193 Andy Greenberg, Hackers Remotely Kill a Jeep on the Highway – With Me in 
It, WIRED (July 21, 2015), https://www.wired.com/2015/07/hackers-remotely-
kill-jeep-highway.  
194 Andy Greenberg, After Jeep Hack, Chrysler Recalls 1.4M Vehicles for Bug 
Fix, WIRED (July 24, 2015), https://www.wired.com/2015/07/jeep-hack-chrysler-
recalls-1-4m-vehicles-bug-fix.  
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more than a hundred million lines of code strengthens the notion that 
security research is essential for vehicles.195 
There are a few shortcomings to this DMCA exemption that 
could further stifle certain types of security research. While the 
exemption does give significant leeway to security researchers who 
circumvent the software of IoT devices designed for “use by 
individual consumers,” it also overlooks an important subgroup of 
IoT devices – those that are not used by individual consumers, such 
as those used by the government or by organizations.196 The DMCA 
exemption does not give guidance on what constitutes a device used 
by “individual consumers” except that it includes voting machines 
within that category. This could potentially stifle security research 
with regard to devices that were not necessarily designed for 
individual consumers’ use. 
i. Good Faith 
The DMCA exemption is conditioned upon “good faith,” 
which is tricky to define in the context of security research, 
particularly on behalf of unaffiliated hackers. The exemption 
provides that security testing  
. . . means accessing a computer program solely for 
purposes of good-faith testing, investigation and/or 
correction of a security flaw or vulnerability, where 
such activity is carried out in a controlled 
environment designed to avoid any harm to 
individuals or the public, and where the 
information derived from the activity is used 
primarily to promote the security or safety of the 
class of devices or machines on which the 
computer program operates, or those who use such 
devices or machines, and is not used or maintained 
                                                     
195 See David Zax, Many Cars Have a Hundred Million Lines of Code, M.I.T. 
TECH. REV. (Dec. 3, 2012), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/508231/many-
cars-have-a-hundred-million-lines-of-code.  
196 See Erik Stallman, A Qualified Win for Cybersecurity Researchers in DMCA 
Triennial Rulemaking, CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY & TECHNOLOGY (Oct. 27, 
2015), https://cdt.org/blog/a-qualified-win-for-cybersecurity-researchers-in-
dmca-triennial-rulemaking/ (arguing that devices “primarily designed for the use 
by individual consumers” excludes a significant portion of devices not used by 
individual consumers).  
 





in a manner that facilitates copyright 
infringement.197 
This requirement limits the security research exemption to 
circumvention efforts intended for testing, investigation, and 
correction of vulnerabilities and flaws. It also requires a controlled 
environment in order to prevent harm to third parties. The 
information obtained through the security research should be used 
primarily to promote security.  
These requirements implicate security research in several 
ways. First, they exclude security researchers who happen to 
stumble upon a vulnerability or who identify a possible fix to a flaw 
without intending to do so. Recently, an “accidental hero” offered a 
kill-switch to the global ransomware “WannaCry,” but according to 
him finding a solution to WannaCry had not been his intention 
initially.198 This could stifle vulnerability reporting by researchers 
whose intentions at the outset are not to promote security. Second, a 
the DMCA does not define “controlled environment,” therefore 
potentially excluding security researchers whose environments 
would not be considered “controlled” and possibly allowing vendors 
to abuse this requirement against unaffiliated security researchers. 
The introduction of cloud computing as a central part of the IoT 
ecosystem is another exacerbating factor to the notion of “controlled 
environment.”199 Third, the exemption provides that information 
gathered from exempted security research should be used 
“primarily” to enhance security and safety. However, this 
potentially opens the door to security research that crosses from a 
white- or gray-hat world into black hat-territory, where motivations 
are usually malicious.200 
Lastly, these requirements provide a glimpse into the 
phenomenon of copyright bleeding over into cybersecurity,201 
                                                     
197 17 U.S.C. § 1201(j)(1). 
198 Nadia Khomami & Olivia Solon, ‘Accidental Hero’ Halts Ransomware Attack 
and Warns: This Is Not Over, GUARDIAN (May 13, 2017), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/may/13/accidental-hero-finds-
kill-switch-to-stop-spread-of-ransomware-cyber-attack.  
199 See Bambauer, supra note 34, at 1091.  
200 See Zetter (Hacker Lexicon), supra note 133. 
201 See Paul Ohm & Black Reid, Regulating Software When Everything Has 
Software, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1672, 1686 (2016) (“Suddenly, the Copyright 
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meaning that the requirement is not necessarily in line with the way 
ethical hackers actually operate in the vulnerability detection space. 
This is more of an institutional problem, in which the question is 
whether the organs involved in the DMCA triennial review process 
are actually well equipped to address the security issues within their 
purview. 
ii. Opposition by U.S. Regulatory Agencies 
Agencies who commented on the proposed exemption 
during the triennial review process had several reservations. While 
the National Telecommunication and Information Administration 
(NTIA) supported the aforementioned exemption to the prohibition 
on circumvention,202 other agencies, such as the FDA, DOT, and 
EPA, strongly opposed and had significant reservations to 
exempting computer programs for good-faith security research.203 
The main thrust of these agencies’ argument is that security research 
into computer programs could actually compromise security and 
privacy. As certain opponents noted, “‘fixing’ of medical devices 
without FDA or manufacturer permission would risk patient safety 
because it would ‘enable others to bypass proper regulatory 
controls.’”204 
The FDA, for example, opposed the exemption because 
every medical device has to undergo FDA pre-market approval,205 
                                                     
Office found itself at the center of a full[-]fledged, multiagency debate over the 
extent to which code regulation might be necessary not just for copyright policy 
reasons, but for environmental, traffic, health, and various other noncopyright 
policy reasons as well.”). 
202 See Sixth Triennial Section 1201 Rulemaking – Recommendations of the 
National Telecommunications and Information Administration to the Register of 
Copyrights (Sept. 18, 2015), 
https://www.copyright.gov/1201/2015/2015_NTIA_Letter.pdf (“[T]o the extent 
that there is a copyright interest, NTIA believes that security research is 
noninfringing and constitutes fair use.”).  
203 Section 1201 Rulemaking: Sixth Triennial Proceeding October 2015 
Recommendation of the Register of Copyrights, p. 313.  
204 Section 1201 Rulemaking: Sixth Triennial Proceeding October 2015 
Recommendation of the Register of Copyrights, p. 293. 
205 See Guidance for Industry and Food and Drug Administration Staff - Content 
of Premarket Submissions for Management of Cybersecurity in Medical Devices 









and unrestricted meddling with or changes to software in medical 
devices would put patients “at increased risk from bad faith attempts 
to modify devices during the period required to develop and obtain 
[FDA] approval for the change.”206 As a result, the FDA, the agency 
responsible for the safety and privacy of medical devices, would not 
be able to support any exemption that would compromise that 
responsibility. 
FDA guidance on Premarket Submissions for Management 
of Cybersecurity in Medical Devices contains certain suggestions 
for vendors of medical devices, such as limiting access to trusted 
users, ensuring trusted content, and planning for detection, response, 
and recovery from security compromises.207 However, this guidance 
is only a recommendation for effective cybersecurity management. 
Though vendors submitting medical devices for FDA premarket 
review will want to implement these recommendations to ensure 
FDA approval, they are by no means legally binding.208 This 
demonstrates that even the seemingly strictest agency in terms of 
IoT security provides only recommended guidelines to vendors, 
highlighting the need for external security research due to the 
increasing volume of vulnerabilities.209 
b. The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA)  
Federal and state statutes have outlawed unauthorized access 
to computers.210 While each state statute is slightly different, they 
all share some basic concepts.211 The CFAA of 1984 criminalizes 
                                                     
206 Section 1201 Rulemaking: Sixth Triennial Proceeding October 2015 
Recommendation of the Register of Copyrights, p. 293.  
207 See Guidance for Industry and Food and Drug Administration Staff - Content 
of Premarket Submissions for Management of Cybersecurity in Medical Devices, 
at 4 (Oct. 2, 2014), available at 
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/medicaldevices/deviceregulationandguidance/g
uidancedocuments/ucm356190.pdf.  
208 See FDA Premarket Content, supra note 207, at 2. 
209 See FDA, Cybersecurity (last updated Mar. 3, 2017), 
https://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DigitalHealth/ucm373213.htm (“This 
vulnerability increases as medical devices are increasingly connected to the 
Internet, hospital networks, and to other medical devices.”).  
210 ORIN KERR, COMPUTER CRIME LAW 29–30 (3rd Ed., 2012). 
211 See Kerr, supra note 210, at 30.  
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certain potentially harmful computer-related activities. Since its 
enactment, the CFAA has been amended ten times, and each time 
its scope has been expanded.212 The CFAA is often said to be one of 
the most “far-reaching criminal laws in the Unites States Code” due 
to its broad language and enforcement.213 This vagueness raises 
constitutionality questions, particularly in the context of the void-
for-vagueness doctrine,214 exerting “pressure on courts to adopt 
narrow interpretations of access and authorization.”215 The statute 
was inspired by the common-law trespass doctrine, which does not 
always fit perfectly with the realities of the Internet.216 
The central provision applicable to security research is 
located in 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2), which deals with unauthorized 
access to protected computers and criminalizes the obtaining of 
“information from any protected computer”217 through intentional 
access to “a computer without authorization” or exceeding 
“authorized access.”218 The concepts of “access” and 
“authorization” have been the subject of substantial debate.219 This 
has led to confusion among computer users, security researchers, 
and even law enforcement.220 Experts admit that this provision has 
the lowest thresholds and is therefore applicable to a broad subset of 
                                                     
212 See Thompson, supra note 13, at 560.  
213 Orin Kerr, Vagueness and Challenges to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 
94 MINN. L. REV. 1561, 1561 (2010).  
214 United States v. Williams, 128 S. Ct. 1830, 1845 (2008) (“Vagueness doctrine 
is an outgrowth not of the First Amendment, but of the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment. A conviction fails to comport with due process if the statute 
under which it is obtained fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair 
notice of what is prohibited, or is so standardless that it authorizes or encourages 
seriously discriminatory enforcement.”). 
215 See Kerr, supra note 213, at 1572. 
216 See Kirsch, supra note 112, at 393.  
217 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C). The CFAA also prohibits obtaining “information 
contained in a financial record of a financial institution, or of a card issuer as 
defined in section 1602(n) of title 15, or contained in a file of a consumer reporting 
agency on a consumer, as such terms are defined in the Fair Credit Reporting Act 
(15 U.S.C. 1681 et seq.).” (18 U.S. Code § 1030(a)(2)(A)] and “information from 
any department or agency of the United States” [18 U.S. Code § 1030(a)(2)(B)]). 
218 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2). 
219 See Orin Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope: Interpreting “Access” and 
“Authorization” in Computer Misuse Statutes, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1596 (2003).  
220 See Kirsch, supra note 112, at 392–93. 
 





online activities.221 It would be outside the scope of this Article to 
reiterate the debate over the precise contours of authorization and 
access. The focus would be on how security research is stifled by 
the prohibition on unauthorized access. 
The scope of unauthorized access largely criminalizes any 
instance of interstate hacking222 and encompasses every Internet-
connected device within the scope of “protected computer,”223 
including anything that has a “microchip or that permits digital 
storage.”224 The CFAA defines “computer” in a broad manner and 
excludes only a few devices, such as “an automated typewriter or 
typesetter, a portable hand held calculator, or other similar 
device.”225 Since some security research requires the use of hacking 
methods, this overbroad approach stifles research into 
vulnerabilities in such critical systems as voting machines,226 
resulting in adversaries learning about these vulnerabilities before 
the vendor can identify them.227 Even at present, security 
researchers at the renowned DefCon hacking conference managed 
                                                     
221 See Kerr, supra note 210, at 78. 
222 See Kerr, supra note 213, at 1567. 
223 See Kerr, supra note 213, at 1571. 
224 See Kerr, supra note 213, at 1571. 
225 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(1) defines a “computer” as “an electronic, magnetic, 
optical, electrochemical, or other high speed data processing device performing 
logical, arithmetic, or storage functions, and includes any data storage facility or 
communications facility directly related to or operating in conjunction with such 
device, but such term does not include an automated typewriter or typesetter, a 
portable hand held calculator, or other similar device.” 
226 See Brian Barrett, America’s Electronic Voting Machines Are Scarily Easy 
Targets, WIRED (Feb. 8, 2016), https://www.wired.com/2016/08/americas-
voting-machines-arent-ready-election (explaining that vulnerable voting 
machines are very much a reality, giving the example of WinVote, Virginia’s 
voting machines that were vulnerable to remote hacking – “anyone within a half 
mile could have modified every vote undetected.”). 
227 See, e.g., Zapotosky, Demirijian, Homeland Security Official: Russian 
Government Actors Tried To Hack Election Systems In 21 States, WASHINGTON 
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to hack into several voting machines in less than ninety minutes.228 
This reveals the need to rebalance the goals of criminal law and 
cybersecurity. 
The over-broadness of computer crime statutes is not a 
problem in only U.S. law; it has also been a matter of concern in 
security research communities overseas. For instance, in the UK, the 
Computer Misuse Act of 1990 was recently amended to criminalize 
the “creation, supply or application of ‘hacker tools’ for use in 
computer misuse offences.”229 This has significantly broadened the 
scope of application of the Act, making ethical hackers concerned 
about potential legal jeopardy.230  
The threat posed to security researchers by the CFAA is far 
from theoretical. In 2002, Bret McDanel, an employee of Tornado 
Development, Inc., was convicted and sentenced to 16 months in 
federal prison for disclosing a serious vulnerability in the online-
messaging product offered by his employer.231 At first, McDanel 
reported the vulnerability to his employer, but the employer never 
patched it.232 As a last resort, McDanel e-mailed as many as 5,600 
Tornado customers to inform them of the unpatched vulnerability. 
As a result, the Department of Justice indicted McDanel, arguing 
that his actions knowingly caused “the transmission of a program, 
information, code, or command, and[,] as a result of such conduct, 
intentionally cause[d] damage without authorization[] to a protected 
computer.”233  
The DOJ has since admitted that prosecuting McDanel was 
a mistake; it filed a motion to reverse the conviction in the Ninth 
                                                     
228 See Adam Lusher, Hackers Breached Defences of US Voting Machines in Less 




229 STEFAN FAFINSKI, COMPUTER MISUSE – RESPONSES, REGULATION AND THE 
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230 A testimony by UK-based technician read, “That’s the end of penetration 
testing. Why would I risk ending up in jail for doing my job? It’s madness. It takes 
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criminals.” Fafinski, supra note 229, at 76. 
231 See Freeman, supra note 27, at 129.  
232 See Freeman, supra note 27, at 129.  
233 18 U.S.C. §1030(a)(5)(A). 
 





Circuit Court of Appeals, noting that his actions had not indicated 
an intent to harm his employer and could have potentially pressured 
his employer to fix the vulnerability, thus protecting the privacy of 
customers using the messaging product.234 The relationship between 
intent and harm is a critical one, since it could exclude security 
researchers from the scope of the CFAA if unauthorized access can 
be shown to lack intent to cause harm.235 Since the CFAA does not 
require a showing of scienter in relation to the harm, it 
“overcriminalizes hacking activity that involves mere access and 
inadvertent minor damage”236 and “effectively establishes strict 
liability beyond the intentional access . . . regardless of moral 
culpability.”237 
However, it is not only hacking that is criminalized; access 
to portions of the Web that the owner did not design for public 
access is also generally deemed illegal. These were the facts in 
United States v. Aurenheimer, where the defendant, Andrew 
Aurenheimer, was charged under the CFAA for “unauthorized 
access” because he revealed an AT&T-owned URL that contained 
private account data belonging to as many as 100,000 iPad users.238 
Such an approach to the concept of unauthorized access puts 
security researchers at risk not only for using hacking techniques but 
also for pursuing benign activities online that the vendor or owner 
deems unfriendly. This leads to “authorization,” a legal term of art 
within the CFAA, being de facto defined by tech companies rather 
                                                     
234 See United States v. Bret McDanel, (Motion for Reversal of Conviction) C.A. 
No. 03-50135, available at http://www.steptoe.com/publications/273a.pdf 
(“[T]he government believes it was an error to argue that defendant intended an 
“impairment” to the integrity of Tornado’s computer system… instead, the 
evidence established that defendant informed Tornado’s customers --- the people 
whose data may have been vulnerable to unauthorized access --- about the 
vulnerability, an action that could have brought about repair of the problem.”). 
Similarly, in United States v. Morris, Morris argued that he had no intent to cause 
damage when he created the Morris worm, although he did have intent to access 
a protected computer in an unauthorized manner (the double scienter question) 
which caused a considerable amount of damage to many computers affected by 
the Morris worm, see United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504, 507 (2d Cir. 1991). 
235 See Thompson, supra note 13, at 562.  
236 See Thompson, supra note 13, at 562. 
237 See Thompson, supra note 13, at 568. 
238 See United States v. Aurenheimer, No. 11-CR-470, 2012 WL 5389142, at *1 
(D.N.J. Oct. 26, 2012).  
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than by Congress, courts, or law enforcement authorities.239 This 
problematic breadth is paired with outdated notions of sentencing, 
discussed in the following subsection. 
1. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines  
The U.S. Federal Sentencing Guidelines can provide insight into 
how courts current approach punishment for computer crimes.240 
The Guidelines provide for harsher punishments for property crimes 
where the criminal act causes great economic loss.241 In the context 
of computer crimes, such a loss includes, among other things, “the 
cost of responding to an offense, conducting a damage assessment, 
and restoring the data, program, system, or information to its 
condition prior to the offense, and any revenue lost . . . .”242 This 
punishment model does not take into account beneficial security 
research, and it ignores the far costlier alternative of malicious 
exploitation of vulnerabilities.243 Losses also include the cost of 
patching a vulnerability, which would have taken place even in 
absence of the crime.244  
The Guidelines impose still greater punishment if the target 
computer belonged to critical infrastructure.245 The exploitation of 
vulnerabilities in critical infrastructure computers, such as those 
intended to manage power and gas, transportation, national security, 
and public health, could result in devastating disruption effects. At 
the same time, if critical infrastructure and other non-critical 
                                                     
239 See Kirsch, supra note 112, at 399. 
240 U.S. Sentencing Guideline Manual (2016). 
241 U.S. Sentencing Guideline Manual § 2B1.1(b)(1) (2016). 
242 2B1.1(3)(v)(III) U.S. Sentencing Guideline Manual § 2B1.1(3)(v)(III) (2016) 
(“reasonable cost to any victim, including the cost of responding to an offense, 
conducting a damage assessment, and restoring the data, program, system, or 
information to its condition prior to the offense, and any revenue lost, cost 
incurred, or other damages incurred because of interruption of service.”). 
243 On the lack of instrumentality in the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, see 
Anonymous, Immunizing the Internet, Or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and 
Love the Worm, 119(8) HARV. L. REV. 2442, 2453 (2006) (“[C]urrent U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines do not sufficiently take instrumental concerns into 
account.”). 
244 See Anonymous, supra note 15, at 2454 (citing Creative Computing v. 
Getloaded.com LLC, 386 F.3d 930, 935–56 (where the court ruled that routine 
maintenance and updating would be assessed as part of the damages)).  
245 U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 2B1.1(b)(18)(A). 
 





computers operate on that same vulnerable software, it would be 
preferable to target the latter from a risk standpoint, however, that is 
not always possible when critical infrastructure computers operate 
on their own software and systems.246 Therefore, the Guidelines 
should also consider the degree of benefit of the act in question, by 
comparing it to the full potential of exploiting the vulnerability, 
which could be far more devastating than the prosecuted crime.247 
IV. CREATING A SECURE HYPERCONNECTED WORLD 
THROUGH LAW 
If law, and the institutions creating, enforcing, and interpreting 
it, were to recognize the benefits of ethical hacking, this could help 
resolve many systematic shortcomings in what experts call the 
“security theater.”248  
First, incentivizing ethical hackers to report vulnerabilities to the 
vendor would decrease the overall number of unpatched 
vulnerabilities, narrowing down the opportunities for adversaries to 
attack the IoT ecosystem. This could also pressure the IoT industry 
to create secure devices, as companies will attempt to avoid public 
shaming based on flaws in their software detected by ethical 
hackers.249 This will by no means prevent malicious hacking 
entirely; it may, however, decrease its likelihood, by increasing the 
costs associated with mounting a cyber-attack and enabling more 
targeted and efficient law enforcement efforts to deal with the most 
serious offenses. This could be achieved through clear distinctions 
between malicious and benevolent actors and through certain 
                                                     
246 See Anonymous, supra note 15, at 2456.  
247 See Anonymous, supra note 15, at 2455 (“[P]unishments should encourage 
attacks that fall shortest of their full destructive potential, at the very least by 
taking into account the gap between potential and actual damage during 
sentencing.”). 
248 Similarly, Bruce Schneier refers to a related phenomenon as “security theater,” 
which is “security measures that make people feel more secure without doing 
anything to actually improve their security.” Bruce Schneier, Beyond Security 
Theater, SCHNEIER ON SECURITY (Nov. 2009), 
https://www.schneier.com/essays/archives/2009/11/beyond_security_thea.html.  
249 Anonymous, Immunizing the Internet, Or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying 
and Love the Worm, 119(8) HARV. L. REV. 2442, 2450 (2006) (“media coverage, 
user complaints can prompt vendors to take action” otherwise, “vendors would be 
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legislative and administrative adjustments, such as clarification of 
the boundaries of the CFAA and DMCA in relation to security 
research. 
 Second, there should be consensus on how to disclose 
vulnerabilities in an acceptable manner. At present, the philosophy 
on disclosure is highly fragmented and context-dependent. In The 
Hacker’s Aegis, Derek Bambauer and Oliver Day recommend that 
security researchers adhere to five rules of thumb, in exchange for 
immunity from civil liability: report the vulnerability to the vendor 
first, do not sell it, test on the researcher’s own system, do not 
weaponized it, and create a trail.250 While these rules are certainly 
helpful, there is still a need to revisit the fundamental disagreement 
over disclosure practices. 
Finally, allowing security researchers to snoop around for 
vulnerabilities is insufficient on its own; important modifications 
should support efforts to patch flaws in software. Such 
modifications might include requiring that vendors embed built-in 
patchability into IoT devices, using privacy tort law to address 
potential externalities associated with security research, tackling 
vendors who employ the “security by obscurity” practice, and 
empowering the FTC to enforce cybersecurity and vulnerability 
management practices against rogue vendors. These modifications 
are required in order to achieve a truly secure IoT ecosystem, one 
that encourages vendor accountability and cooperation. 
a. Distinguishing Malicious from Benign Hackers 
The main difficulty with the proposition that security 
research should not be impeded by legal hurdles is that it is 
somewhat burdensome to draw a clear line between benign and 
malicious activities in cyberspace.251 This difficulty mainly arises 
because hackers use the same tools regardless of their motives. 
                                                     
250 See Bambauer, supra note 34, at 1088.  
251 See generally Larisa Long, Profiling Hackers, SANS Institute InfoSec Reading 
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There are factors, however, that distinguish between 
malicious and benign hackers, though they are highly dependent on 
the specific case and facts in question. It is one thing to discover a 
vulnerability, and it is quite a different thing to exploit that 
vulnerability to its full disruptive and destructive potential.252 The 
red line here should be focused on weaponization and exploitation 
– whether the hacker simply identified a flaw and reported it 
responsibly to the vendor (ethical hacking), or whether she or he 
exploited it to cause damage (malicious hacking). This is a case-by-
case assessment that should focus on whether the hacker used tools 
and techniques that caused minimal harm given the specific 
circumstances. 
The central part of this assessment is the nature of the 
vulnerability. Some vulnerabilities allow access to certain protected 
information; others grant full administrator privileges; and some 
could even result in malfunction or destruction of the hacked device. 
The dividing line is between reasonable tools and effects of 
vulnerability research versus unreasonable techniques that cause 
damage beyond what is required to identify the flaw.  
Weaponization of a vulnerability can indicate that a hacker 
is motivated not by a desire to fix flaws but rather by a wish to 
monetize or exploit the vulnerability in a manner that causes damage 
to the unsecure computer systems and networks and thus violates 
the law. However, weaponizing a vulnerability (creating a 
mechanism to exploit the vulnerability) requires a tremendous 
amount of time and resources, and such a substantial activity would 
make it easier for law enforcement to determine whether the act in 
question is malicious or benign, since the effort of weaponizing is 
not trivial.253 
Supplementing factors include whether hackers cooperate 
with law enforcement (if it comes to that), whether they disclose 
                                                     
252 See Paul Stockton & Michele Golabek-Goldman, Curbing the Market for 
Cyber Weapons, 32 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 239, 244 (2013) (“[A]s an alternative 
to engaging in ‘responsible disclosure,’ a researcher could instead ‘exploit’ or 
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253 See Paul Stockton, Michele Golabek-Goldman, Curbing the Market for Cyber 
Weapons, 32 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 239, 245 (2013) (noting that “transforming 
a vulnerability into a weaponized exploit may require significant investments of 
time, money, and resources”).  
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their actions and findings to the vendor, and whether they provide 
as much information as possible to relevant agencies, if needed – for 
example, reporting a pacemaker vulnerability to the FDA, or using 
US-CERT as an intermediary in the process. At least one 
commentator argues that if a security researcher notifies the vendor 
within 24–48 hours of his or her activities, it should provide a “safe-
harbor” in terms of CFAA liability.254 
b. Legislative and Administrative Efforts to Date 
Congress has realized the importance of ethical hacking on 
many occasions, primarily in proposed legislation initiatives. 
Recently, the Senate introduced a bipartisan “Internet of Things 
(IoT) Cybersecurity Improvement Act of 2017” bill, proposing, 
among other things, to amend the CFAA and DMCA to allow good-
faith security research of “Internet-connected device(s)” used by a 
“department or agency of the United States.”255 The bill expands the 
notion of security research, which is already part of the DMCA 
exemption, to IoT devices used by the U.S. government and its 
agencies, removing the legal barriers if researchers follow a clear set 
of guidelines.256 This addresses part of the critique this Article 
makes of the current DMCA exemption for security research, which 
excludes a whole subset of Internet-connected devices. 
The Bill also requests that IoT contractors certify that their 
devices do not have any known vulnerabilities and that they are 
patchable and follow industry-standard protocols.257 More 
importantly, the Bill empowers the National Protection and 
Programs Directorate (NPPD) to create guidelines, in consultation 
with security researchers, for vulnerability disclosure. At present, 
and as discussed below, there is no uniform federally mandated 
vulnerability disclosure procedure, and creating authoritative rules 
in this area is of the utmost importance.258 However, this Bill creates 
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only minimal standards of cybersecurity and includes exceptions 
that still leave many potential gaps. 
Additionally, in response to the Jeep hack, the Senate 
introduced a bill that deals specifically with vehicle security by 
requiring isolation of critical software systems from other internal 
networks as well as penetration testing by security analysts and 
onboard systems to detect malicious activity.259 Considering that 
vehicle software may have as many as a hundred million lines of 
code, substantially more than other software, this vehicle-specific 
bill makes a lot of sense.260 This demonstrates the magnitude of 
potential individuals (and vehicles) affected by unpatched bugs, the 
fact that it was not the vehicle manufacturer who identified the 
vulnerability, and that Congress realizes the looming threat of 
Internet-connected vehicles running flawed software. This has also 
led the vehicle industry to invest more in cybersecurity efforts. 
Volkswagen, for example, has established its very own 
cybersecurity firm with the goal of preventing hacking.261  
Recently, Congress, realizing how integral ethical hacking is 
to overall cybersecurity, has attempted to come up with a resolution 
that proactively promotes ethical hacking,262 including a bill 
creating a bug bounty program for vulnerabilities disclosed in a 
“Hack the Department of Homeland Security” program.263 Other 
                                                     
259 Security and Privacy in Your Car Act of 2015 (114th Cong.) 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senate-bill/1806/all-info.  
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departments announced similar challenges for private citizens, 
including the Department of Defense (“Hack the Pentagon”),264 
which also contacted the well-known vulnerability coordination 
platform HackerOne265 in order to facilitate a vulnerability 
disclosure program for private security researchers.266 
c. Clarifying CFAA and DMCA Boundaries 
Clarifying the boundaries of CFAA and DMCA as 
pertaining to security researchers is immensely important.267 The 
CFAA’s strict liability for access “without authorization” is 
certainly a major threat to security researchers. At the same time, it 
discourages talented researchers from engaging responsibly with 
vendors. Although there have been many calls to reform the CFAA 
in recent years,268 this Article advances a proposal focused on the 
DOJ, the prosecuting authority of the CFAA. The DOJ already 
acknowledged in the McDanel case that it had erred when it 
prosecuted an employee exposing a vulnerability in his employer’s 
product.269 This, however, is only one individual case and does not 
necessarily provide guidance for potential future prosecutions of 
security researchers engaged in vulnerability snooping. 
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266 See HackerOne, Hack the Pentagon, 
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The recommendation, therefore, is to facilitate publicly 
available CFAA enforcement guidelines in the context of security 
research. This would ensure that white- and gray hat-hackers 
engaging in vulnerability research are aware of the boundaries and 
limitations and of their rights and duties. For example, a simple port 
scan, a basic operation used to learn about services running on a 
computer and entryways into the system, could lead to prosecution 
under the CFAA.270 While this is clearly absurd in the eyes of 
security researchers, law enforcement authorities may not have the 
same perspective. This is just one example of the many basic 
activities of security researchers on which the CFAA should 
elaborate, particularly in light of the Senate Judiciary Committee’s 
statement during the passage of Section 1030(a)(2) clarifying that 
“mere observation of the data” is enough to qualify as “obtaining 
information,” a constitutive element of the crime of unauthorized 
access.271 This would place security researchers who do not copy, 
exfiltrate, or steal protected information under potential criminal 
liability. 
Recently, the DOJ released to the public a Memorandum by 
the Attorney General setting guidelines for consistent law 
enforcement of “Computer Crime Matters.”272 While the 
Memorandum does acknowledge that federal criminal statutes 
“have not kept pace uniformly with developments in technology,” it 
does not acknowledge the emerging unsecure IoT ecosystem and the 
role of ethical hackers. The Memorandum offers certain factors for 
consideration in CFAA prosecutions, such as the sensitivity of the 
                                                     
270 Though, a U.S. District Court in Moulton v. VC3 ruled that port scan is not in 
violation of the CFAA, its decision does not have binding authority. See Moulton 
v. VC3, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19916 (N.D. Ga.). 
271 Senate Judiciary Committee Report No. 99 432, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., at 6–7 
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computer system affected, national security concerns, and any nexus 
to a larger criminal endeavor. 
The DMCA exemption for security research also raises 
questions in relation to scope and the meanings of key terms. Since 
exemptions expire after three years, requiring renewed submission 
of petitions for exemptions, that could be an opportunity to further 
clarify what a security research exemption means, especially when 
it comes to devices not for individual consumer use, and the 
meaning of “controlled environment” in the age of cloud 
computing.273 
d. Requiring Built-In Patchability in IoT Devices 
The important work of security researchers in the field of IoT 
security will not bear any fruit if IoT devices cannot be patched in 
the first place. While computer users generally have control over 
what they install, this is not necessarily the case in the IoT context, 
where users have limited control over security features and have to 
trust the vendor to ensure up-to-date and secure software. This 
means that regulators would have to require vendors to manufacture 
IoT devices that can be patched if security flaws are discovered. The 
reality is that the market does not incentivize vendors to do so; we 
must therefore consider a regulatory approach.274  
Patchability has been an important topic of discussion in the 
IoT regulation context. Many agencies, including the FTC and 
NTIA, have been strong proponents of patchability as a requirement 
for responsible IoT manufacturing.275 Patching is a substantial part 
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thin profit margin, are typically working on or shipping the next version of the 
chip, while the original device manufacturers-who often do not get their brand 
name on the finished product-are working to upgrade their product to support the 
new chip. In this mindset, where getting the product to the market is the 
overwhelming priority, security may not be a priority.”). 
275 See National Telecommunications & Information Administration, 
Multistakeholder Process; Internet of Things (IoT) Security Upgradability and 
 





of overall security, but it is by no means a magic solution. Many 
users do not patch their software (if given a choice); certain 
organizations, such as hospitals and power plants, cannot patch 
immediately due to concerns that the patch may create functionality 
problems; and patches often have flaws themselves.276  
e. Privacy Tort Law Solutions  
Allowing individual hackers to perform security research 
may put privacy at risk should researchers encounter sensitive 
private information.277 Users whose private information is 
compromised or disseminated to the public should have legal 
recourse. In this context, privacy tort law may provide a partial 
remedy for informational harms caused by security research, even 
in cases where the private information is not otherwise protected by 
data protection laws.278 Recent literature focuses on two torts – 
intrusion upon seclusion and publicity given to private life.279 
So far, courts have largely dismissed data breach lawsuits by 
consumers against vendors, ruling that if consumers do not suffer 
quantifiable harm, there is no legal cause of action.280 These, 
however, are lawsuits against vendors; courts may reach a different 
conclusion if the defendant is a security researcher who overstepped 
                                                     
Patching (July 18, 2017), https://www.ntia.doc.gov/other-
publication/2016/multistakeholder-process-iot-security.  
276 See Kesan & Hayes, supra note 73, at 787.  
277 Some guidance could be provided by laws dealing with the protection of 
certain types of information. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 164.306 (Health Insurance 
Portability and Accessibility Act – HIPAA) (providing the security standards for 
electronic protected health information).  
278 See Alexander Tran, The Internet of Things and Potential Remedies in Privacy 
Tort Law, 50 COLUM. J. L. SOC. PROB. 263, 266 (2017). 
279 See Tran, supra note 155, at 280.  
280 See The Liability of Technology Companies for Data Breaches, ZURICH 
(ADVISEN) (2010), 
https://www.advisen.com/downloads/Emerging_Cyber_Tech.pdf (“Legal experts 
note that the majority of courts have rejected data breach claims brought by 
affected persons that did not suffer any appreciable injury. Simply having one’s 
personal information lost or stolen may not be sufficient, as the plaintiff must 
actually have suffered a loss in order to claim damages.”). 
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the boundaries of his or her specific research, though proving harm 
will still be a necessary component.281 
f. Vulnerability Disclosure Procedure 
The process by which vulnerabilities are disclosed has been 
a contentious topic in recent years.282 Vulnerability disclosure283 is 
essentially a double-edged sword; the benefits extracted from it are 
largely dependent on the methods of disclosure, including the parties 
who learn about it and what they decide to do with that 
information.284 Intuition suggests that once security researchers 
identify a vulnerability, they should disclose it to the relevant party, 
who would in turn fix or patch the flaw, thereby enhancing the 
overall security of the software. In the words of then-Secretary of 
Defense Ash Carter this would be the equivalent of a “‘see 
something, say something’ policy for the digital domain.”285 
Reality, however, has been slightly more complicated than that.  
While disclosing vulnerabilities to the vendor was the norm 
for many years, security researchers became increasingly frustrated 
because they were often ignored by vendors, who were reluctant 
                                                     
281 See Strategic Principles for Securing the Internet of Things (IoT), Department 
of Homeland Security (Nov. 15, 2016), 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Strategic_Principles_for_Se
curing_the_Internet_of_Things-2016-1115-FINAL....pdf (suggesting that 
“[w]hile there is not yet an established body of case law addressing IoT context, 
traditional tort principles of product liability can be expected to apply.”). 
282 Susan Brenner, Complicit Publication: When Should the Dissemination of 
Ideas and Data be Criminalized?, 13 ALB. L. J. SCI. & TECH. 101, 237 (2003) 
(arguing that the controversy about vulnerability disclosure is over how the 
information is disseminated).  
283 See Williams, Pescatore, and Proctor, Responsible Vulnerability Disclosure: 
Guidance for Researchers, Vendors, and End Users, at 3, GARTNER (Oct. 17, 
2016), http://attrition.org/misc/ee/gartner-responsible_disclosure-144061.pdf 
(“Publicity over vulnerabilities in software products is a double-edged sword. 
Making vulnerabilities public has, unfortunately, proved necessary to spur some 
software vendors to invest in better software development, patch production and 
patch distribution processes. However, it has also enabled attackers to more 
quickly produce exploits”). 
284 See Williams et al., supra note 283.  
285 See U.S. Department of Defense, DOD Announces Digital Vulnerability 










investigate reported vulnerabilities.286 At that point, researchers 
published only very limited information about the existence of a 
vulnerability to the public, which resulted in some vendors claiming 
these vulnerabilities were “theoretical.”287 Only when security 
researchers finally published the information they had to the public 
in full did vendors start taking these matters seriously.288 This has 
led to a fragmentation of the philosophy on vulnerability disclosure. 
While certain experts advocate for “responsible disclosure,” which 
primarily focuses on disclosing vulnerabilities to the vendor, there 
is a strong group of experts who oppose that approach and argue for 
“full disclosure,” encouraging security researchers to publish the 
flaws they have identified to the broader public and assuming the 
vendor will then be pressured to fix the flaw more promptly.289 
There is a substantial group of individuals and organizations who 
adopt the “nondisclosure” approach to vulnerabilities, mainly black 
hats and intelligence agencies such as the National Security 
Agency.290 
i. Responsible Disclosure 
Responsible disclosure typically refers to reporting a 
vulnerability to the relevant vendor and allowing the vendor a 
certain amount of time to fix the vulnerability, depending on its 
complexity and other circumstances.291 This type of disclosure is the 
                                                     
286 See Bruce Schneier, Schneier: Full Disclosure of Security Vulnerabilities a 
‘Damned Good Idea’, SCHNEIER ON SECURITY (Jan. 2007), 
https://www.schneier.com/essays/archives/2007/01/schneier_full_disclo.html.  
287 See Schneier, supra note 286.  
288 See Schneier, supra note 286. 
289 Edward Freeman, Vulnerability Disclosure: The Strange Case of Bret 
McDanel, 16 INFORMATION SYSTEMS SECURITY 127, 128 (2007). 
290 See Bruce Schneier, The NSA Is Hoarding Vulnerabilities, SCHNEIER ON 
SECURITY (Aug. 26, 2016), 
https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2016/08/the_nsa_is_hoar.html 
(explaining how the NSA is hoarding vulnerabilities of software used both by 
private and governmental entities, including companies like Cisco, Fortinet, 
TOPSEC, and more. A portion of these vulnerabilities was patched since, but 
some vulnerabilities were still unknown until a group named Shadow Brokers 
leaked 300 megabytes worth of NSA-hoarded vulnerabilities).  
291 See Marc Laliberte, A Look Inside Responsible Vulnerability Disclosure, DARK 
READING (Jan. 5, 2017), http://www.darkreading.com/threat-intelligence/a-look-
inside-responsible-vulnerability-disclosure/a/d-id/1327800 (“First, the researcher 
identifies a security vulnerability and its potential impact . . . . Next, the researcher 
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most commonly used approach by vendors, who naturally prefer to 
learn about the vulnerability before other parties or the public.292 
Initially, the DMCA exemption for security research was expected 
to include a requirement of responsible disclosure as part of its good-
faith term. However, the Librarian of Congress noted that the 
community was divided on what constituted responsible disclosure 
and that therefore the DMCA rulemaking did not require 
responsible, or any other, type of disclosure other than requiring that 
information gathered be used primarily “to promote the security or 
safety” of the device in question.293 
This is not to say that the public will not learn about the 
vulnerability; rather, such information will be released to the public 
only once a patch is released and the risk of exploitation by third 
                                                     
creates a vulnerability advisory report including a detailed description of the 
vulnerability, supporting evidence, and a full disclosure timeline . . . . After 
submitting the advisory to the vendor, the researcher typically allows the vendor 
a reasonable amount of time to investigate and fix the exploit . . . . Finally, once 
a patch is available or the disclosure timeline (including any extensions) has 
elapsed, the researcher publishes a full disclosure analysis of the vulnerability.”). 
292 See, e.g., US CERT/CC Vulnerability Disclosure Policy, available at 
http://www.cert.org/vulnerability-analysis/vul-disclosure.cfm? (providing that 
“vulnerabilities reported . . . will be disclosed to the public 45 days after the initial 
report, regardless of the existence or available of patches”). See also Chris Evans 
& Drew Hintz, Disclosure Timeline for Vulnerabilities Under Active Attack, 
GOOGLE SECURITY BLOG (May 29, 2013), 
https://security.googleblog.com/2013/05/disclosure-timeline-for-
vulnerabilities.html (“Our standing recommendation is that companies should fix 
critical vulnerabilities within 60 days—or, if a fix is not possible, they should 
notify the public about the risk and offer workarounds.”).  
293 See U.S. Copyright Office, Library of Congress, Exemption to Prohibition on 
Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Access Control Technologies, 
80 FR 65944, 65956 (Oct. 28, 2015) (“As explained above, a significant issue 
with respect to the security exemptions involves the proper disclosure of security 
research findings, as the interests of the manufacturer and the public may both be 
affected by the nature and timing of disclosure of software flaws. Indeed, 
Congress included disclosure to the system developer as one of the factors to be 
considered in determining a person's eligibility for the security testing exemption 
in section 1201(j). Although the Register expressed support for responsible 
disclosure of security flaws, she acknowledged the difficulty of attempting to 
define disclosure standards in the context of this rulemaking, as opinions seem 
sharply divided on this point. Accordingly, rather than incorporating an express 
disclosure rule, the recommended exemption draws upon what the Register 
perceives to be the basic intent of section 1201(j) by specifying that the 
information derived from the research activity be used primarily to promote the 
security or safety of the devices containing the computer programs on which the 
research is conducted, or of those who use those devices.”). 
 





parties decreases.294 Another variation of responsible disclosure is 
reporting all information regarding the vulnerability to the vendor 
while disclosing only limited information, excluding the proof of 
concept, to the public.295 However, even that approach does not 
necessarily prevent malicious hackers from reverse-engineering the 
general vulnerability information that is provided to the public.296 
The general idea is to ensure that the public will not be able to 
directly use the information to exploit the vulnerability. 
ii. Full Disclosure 
Full disclosure, unlike responsible disclosure, is the practice 
of reporting a vulnerability to the public to the fullest extent possible 
and without informing the vendor of it beforehand.297 The practice 
of full disclosure is evidence of some of the frustration of the 
security research community resulting from vendors sometimes 
ignoring vulnerabilities reported to them.298 It is immensely 
controversial because it allows equal access to information about a 
vulnerability to vendors and to potential exploiters.299 The idea 
behind full disclosure is to pressure the vendor to patch the 
vulnerability since public scrutiny is a strong motivation for vendors 
                                                     
294 See Stephen Lynch, Full Disclosure: Infosec Industry Still Fighting Over 
Vulnerability Reporting, CISCO UMBRELLA (Oct. 16, 2015), 
https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/blog/2015/10/16/full-disclosure-infosec-
industry-still-fighting. 
295 See EFF, Coders’ Rights Project Vulnerability Reporting FAQ, 
https://www.eff.org/issues/coders/vulnerability-reporting-faq.  
296 See Bambauer, supra note 34, at 1064 (explaining that “if they describe flaws 
with too much precision, hackers can probe the weaknesses, but if they are too 
general, customers will encounter difficulty taking precautions”). 
297 See Taiwo Oriola, Bugs for Sale: Legal and Ethical Properties of the Market 
in Software Vulnerabilities, 28 J. COMP. & INF. L. 451, 483 (2011) (“[A] full 
disclosure occurs where independent security analysts promptly post 
vulnerabilities to a public listing.”).  
298 See Bruce Schneier, Debating Full Disclosure, SCHNEIER ON SECURITY (Jan. 
23, 2007), 
https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2007/01/debating_full_d.html.  
299 See Stephen Lynch, Full Disclosure: Infosec Industry Still Fighting Over 
Vulnerability Reporting, CISCO UMBRELLA (Oct. 16, 2015), 
https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/blog/2015/10/16/full-disclosure-infosec-
industry-still-fighting (arguing that full disclosure is controversial because it 
creates a race between vendors and potential exploiters, who both have equal 
access to the information pertaining to the vulnerability). 
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to take security seriously.300 Bruce Schneier, a supporter of the full 
disclosure practice, called it a “damned good idea,” 301 and many 
others agree.  
However, full disclosure is not always a provocative step 
against vendors. It is often used to publish information about a 
vulnerability so that customers can protect themselves from 
exploitation, given that the vendor will either ignore or take too long 
to fix the flaw. Many assume that full disclosure allows malicious 
actors to exploit vulnerabilities published by security researchers, 
but there is an assumption that black-hat hackers are aware of certain 
vulnerabilities, if not sold them in the zero-day vulnerability 
market.302 
iii. The Road Forward on Vulnerability Disclosure 
This subsection has demonstrated that the debate over 
vulnerability disclosure stems from distrust between security 
researchers and vendors.303 But security researchers could regain 
their trust in vendors, and vice versa, if a robust form of oversight is 
implemented. This can be achieved by relying on intermediaries and 
enforcers of norms in that context  – for example, US-CERT and the 
FTC. Primarily, this will require official guidelines from an 
authoritative body (the FTC, for example) regarding how to 
responsibly disclose vulnerabilities in a way that properly balances 
vendors’ interests and the need for cybersecurity. 
g. Transnational Law Enforcement and Reducing 
National Security Threats 
                                                     
300 See Schneier, supra note 298.  
301 Bruce Schneier, Schneier: Full Disclosure of Security Vulnerabilities a 
‘Damned Good Idea’, CSO ONLINE (Jan. 9, 2007), 
http://www.csoonline.com/article/216205/schneier-full-disclosure-ofsecurity-
vulnerabilities-a-damned-good-idea-.  
302 See Schneier, supra note 286. 
303 See Vulnerability Disclosure Attitudes and Actions, Research Report from the 
NTIA Awareness and Adoption Group, 
https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/2016_ntia_a_a_vulnerability_di
sclosure_insights_report.pdf (“The assumptions and prejudices that impede 
collaboration between researchers and technology providers may be based on past 
experience.”).  
 





The DOJ recently indicted a group of Russian FSB officers 
who were involved in hacking Yahoo!, gaining access to as many as 
500 million e-mail accounts.304 Transnational law enforcement is 
expensive and resource-intensive. In an environment friendlier to 
ethical hacking, where tech companies do not threaten security 
researchers, such a massive data breach could have been prevented. 
In addition, the FBI has already admitted that it is losing the “war 
on hackers,”305 which indicates that law enforcement may be 
increasingly inclined to consider “alternative architectures that are 
more secure” in the first place.306 
Patching vulnerabilities before foreign governments learn 
about them could enhance overall national security. If we assume 
that national security includes dams, transportation, healthcare, and 
other sectors operating on information technology, we might also 
conclude that patching vulnerabilities in advance would keep 
foreign malicious actors largely at bay, since their options to attack 
the cyber infrastructure would be limited to only zero-day 
vulnerabilities, which would be far more limited than the number of 
vulnerabilities that could be identified by ethical hackers and 
patched by the manufacturer.  
h. Tackling Security by Obscurity 
The concept of security by obscurity provides that keeping the 
code for a particular piece of software, and therefore vulnerabilities 
in that code, hidden and unknown to hackers can make the software 
seemingly more secure.307 In software engineering, this is 
                                                     
304 Department of Justice, U.S. Charges Russian FSB Officers and Their Criminal 
Conspirators for Hacking Yahoo and Millions of Email Accounts (Mar. 15, 2017) 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-charges-russian-fsb-officers-and-their-
criminal-conspirators-hacking-yahoo-and-millions.  




306 See Robert Mueller, Combating Threats in the Cyber World: Outsmarting 
Terrorists, Hackers, and Spies, 2012 RSA Cyber Security Conference (Mar. 1, 
2012), https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/speeches/combating-threats-in-the-
cyber-world-outsmarting-terrorists-hackers-and-spies. 
307 See Yana Welinber, Facing Real-Time Identification in Mobile Apps & 
Wearable Computers, 30 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 89, 128 
(2014). 
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sometimes called “obfuscation.”308 Vendors may make their code 
overly complex or ridden with gibberish code lines in order to 
confuse a potential attacker. But this has not worked in the past, and 
it will not work in the future. In today’s cybersecurity world, it is 
almost impossible to hide vulnerabilities; the only way to prevent 
their exploitation is to patch them and get rid of them.309 Security by 
obscurity also violates Kerckhoff’s principle,310 which posits that 
the public release of a system should not be to its detriment, since 
systems should be secure by design, not due to their confusing 
nature.311 
This shows that the emphasis on securing IoT devices should be 
on revealing vulnerabilities, possibly providing an incentive for 
individuals to do so, as well as on patching those vulnerabilities, 
which is the responsibility of the vendor.  
In this regard, the FTC can play an important role. The FTC has 
been recently actively enforcing consumer privacy based on Section 
                                                     
308 Innovation, Software, and Reverse Engineering, 18 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER 
& HIGH TECH. L.J. 121, 131 (2001) (“[C]ode obfuscation consists of a process by 
which code contains sufficient decoys to obstruct reverse engineering.”).  
309 Michael Gegick & Sean Barnum, Never Assuming That Your Secrets Are 
Safe, US-CERT (Sep. 14, 2015), https://www.us-
cert.gov/bsi/articles/knowledge/principles/never-assuming-that-your-secrets-are-
safe (“Always assume that an attacker knows everything that you know -- 
assume the attacker has access to all source code and all designs. Even if this is 
not true, it is trivially easy for an attacker to determine obscured information.”) 
(citing Howard & LeBlanc, Chapter 3, Security Principles to Live By, IN NEVER 
DEPEND ON SECURITY THROUGH OBSCURITY ALONE 66–67). 
310 See Jesper Johansson & Roger Grimes, The Great Debate: Security by 
Obscurity, MICROSOFT TECHNET MAGAZINE (June 2008), 
https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/2008.06.obscurity.aspx (“Security by 
obscurity is, in a nutshell, a violation of Kerckhoffs’ Principle, which holds that a 
system should be secure because of its design, not because the design is unknown 
to an adversary. The basic premise of Kerckhoffs’ Principle is that secrets don't 
remain secret for very long.”). But see Corey Nachreiner, How a Little Obscurity 
Can Bolster Security, DARK READING (Apr. 17, 2014), 
http://www.darkreading.com/risk/how-a-little-obscurity-can-bolster-
security/d/d-id/1204452.  
311 See Bruce Schneier, Secrecy, Security, and Obscurity, SCHNEIER ON SECURITY 
(May 15, 2002), https://www.schneier.com/crypto-
gram/archives/2002/0515.html (“Today, there is considerable benefit in 
publication, and there is even more benefit from using already published, already 
analyzed, designs of others. Keeping these designs secret is needless obscurity. 
Kerckhoffs’ Principle says that there should be no security determent from 
publication.”).  
 





5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, which prohibits “unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.”312 The FTC 
has become a “de facto data protection authority.”313 Given that the 
degree of privacy could be affected by the strength of security, the 
FTC ought to ensure that companies do not engage in practices that 
could compromise private information belonging to consumers, 
with security by obscurity being one of those practices.314 
Furthermore, the Third Circuit in FTC v. Wyndham held that the 
FTC has authority to sue for inadequate security practices.315 
This common law of FTC privacy enforcement could lead to 
stronger enforcement against companies who do not act according 
to industry best practices of privacy and security.316 Security by 
obscurity, a practice that certain vendors adopt in order to avoid 
vulnerability detection, should be treated as a deceptive or unfair 
practice in the same way the FTC deals with other security-violating 
practices.317 The FTC has already pursued action against an IoT 
vendor, TRENDnet, in a claim that its smart webcams did not 
provide consumers with “reasonable security to prevent 
unauthorized access to sensitive information, namely the live feeds 
from the IP cameras.”318 It is anticipated that the FTC will pursue 
further enforcement against IoT vendors who engage in unfair or 
deceptive security or privacy practices, which should encompass 
                                                     
312 See 15 U.S.C § 45(a)(1). 
313 See Steven Hetcher, The De Facto Federal Privacy Commission, 19 J. 
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 109, 131 (2000). 
314 See Daniel Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and The New Common Law 
of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV 583, (2014) 
315 FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 236 (3d Cir. 2015).  
316 See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 314, at 653 (providing examples of FTC 
common law of privacy enforcement against companies for “[f]ailure to 
implement cheap, easy-to-use, or common industry security practices”).  
317 See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 314, at 637 (“In the early 2000s, the FTC 
initiated a flurry of activity around security—nearly overshadowing its privacy 
cases.”).  
318 See Trendnet, Inc., No. 122-3090, 2013 WL 4858250, at *2 (F.T.C. Sept. 3, 
2013) (“[A]s a result, hackers exploited the security vulnerabilities leading to 
‘compromised live feeds display[ing] private areas of users’ homes and allow[ing] 
the unauthorized surveillance of infants sleeping in their cribs, young children 
playing, and adults engaging in typical daily activities.”) (cited in Tran, supra note 
155, at 276). 
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practices like security by obscurity and, perhaps, unwillingness to 
respond to vulnerability disclosures.  
V. CONCLUSION 
This Article argues that the DMCA and CFAA impede security 
research into software vulnerabilities, which are on the rise in the 
emerging IoT ecosystem due to an industry-specific market failure. 
These legal barriers discourage security researchers from 
discovering flaws and reporting them to the relevant vendors, which 
would enhance overall privacy and security. This could be partially 
resolved by mitigating the threat of legal jeopardy through 
clarification of the DMCA and CFAA boundaries as well as by 
enacting legal and regulatory adaptations such as requiring 
patchability in IoT, tackling security by obscurity, and enforcing the 
law against noncomplying vendors. This will create a friendly and 
fruitful environment for security research, leading to a more secure 
IoT ecosystem and, ultimately, a more secure Internet system. 
The IoT ecosystem creates a host of opportunities but also a 
variety of risks and dangers, which should be addressed through 
legitimizing the activities of the community of dedicated 
vulnerability hunters. Security research is important where market 
forces fail and where vendors are unlikely to discover vulnerabilities 
on their own, which they currently lack the incentive to do. Broad 
interpretation of these “anti-hacking” laws is resulting in a less 
secure Internet, and the stakes are constantly increasing given the 
ubiquity of sensors and physicality of the IoT ecosystem.  
The law should clearly distinguish between white- and gray-hat 
hackers, whose purpose is to fix flaws (to varying degrees), and 
black-hat hackers, who use vulnerabilities for criminal ends. This 
distinction has been overlooked for too long, and IoT ought to be a 
turning point in that regard, creating a space for benevolent actors 
to fully utilize their talent. 
